Malignant Narcissism, Perception-Adjustment, and The Trait-Behaviour Nexus: Understanding Dictatorial Extremity

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Abstract

Conducting a psychological study of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, this dissertation investigates dictator psychology and the influence of ‘malignant narcissism’ on dictatorial inclination to behavioural extremity. Informed by political psychology and psychoanalytic theory, this research contends that the defective superego, paranoia, and grandiose self-conception associated with ‘malignant narcissism’ propel extreme action. Exemplifying such extremity through the Anfal (1988) and Srebrenica (1995) genocides, this investigation additionally recognises the facilitating role of ‘perception-adjustment’. A theoretical model is outlined to highlight the interrelation of ‘malignant narcissism’, ‘perception-adjustment’, and behavioural extremity, identifying ‘malignant narcissism’ as a specific set of trait scores, associated with Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).

An empirical study is conducted via LTA content analysis of 100 interview and speech transcripts, alongside evaluation of secondary personality profiles to generate key research materials. Original personality profiles are constructed and evaluated thematically in accordance with LTA’s seven trait-framework (belief in control over events, self-confidence, need for power, conceptual complexity, ingroup bias, task focus and distrust of others) to satisfy central research questions. Principal conclusions illuminate both the proposed ‘malignant narcissist’ trait set and prominent employment of ‘perception-adjustment’ within the leaders examined, contributing to existing political and psychological research surrounding dictator psychology.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Diagnosing the ‘malignant narcissist’ is a complex feat. Lacking a clear and precise identity, the behavioural manifestations of their paranoia, grandiose self-conception, and defective superego illuminate a diagnosis of dictatorial leaders as ‘malignant narcissists’ (Freud, 1920/2012; Glad, 2002; Post, 1993; Lachkar, 2004). Alongside this, the commonality of dictatorial behaviour across political leadership emphasises the need to expand existing analyses of dictator psychology to diagnose and thereby protect civilians from leaders inclined to “grand crimes” of extreme violence (Glad, 2002: 6; Lasswell, 1948; DiRenzo, 1974). Employing an interdisciplinary approach spanning the fields of ‘political psychology’ and ‘psychoanalysis’, this investigation deciphers the rationale underpinning the dictatorial proclivity towards extreme violence.

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<th>Theme</th>
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<td>1. Diagnosis of Dictators</td>
<td>i. To what extent do Hussein and Milošević illustrate whether dictators can be diagnosed as ‘malignant narcissists’?</td>
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<td>2. Methodological</td>
<td>i. How effectively does the ‘LTA’ content analysis approach evince dictator psychology?</td>
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<td>ii. Can research into dictator psychology rely exclusively on ‘collateral information’-based analyses?</td>
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<td>3. Traits vs. ‘Perception-Adjustment’</td>
<td>i. How central is ‘perception-adjustment’ to the trait-behaviour nexus?</td>
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Figure 1. ‘Statement of Aims: Key Research Questions’ – Author.

To examine the genocidal extremism of Saddam Hussein (Iraq, 1979-2003) and Slobodan Milošević (Serbia, 1990-2000), this analysis combines Hermann’s (1980a; 1999)
seven-trait framework with ‘malignant narcissism’ to facilitate investigation of key ‘dictator psychology’ research questions (Figure 1). Specifically, through a dualist methodology comprising content analysis and evaluation of ‘collateral information’-based (secondary) personality profiles, original profile construction successfully connects ‘trait scores’ to the concepts of ‘malignant narcissism’ and ‘perception-adjustment’. An introduced concept, ‘perception-adjustment’ signifies the agentive reconstitution of behaviour and ideas, facilitating the adoption and perpetuation of morally questionable action. Incorporating theoretical assumptions of dissonance-related ‘moral disengagement’ and ‘sanitisation of language’, the profile results of Hussein and Milošević underscore interrelation between ‘malignant narcissist’ traits and the ‘perception-adjustment’ process (Festinger, 1957; Kelman, 1973 Bandura, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005; Dutton, 2007).

Whilst constructing additional personality profiles would permit greater investigative breadth, the purpose of a Hussein and Milošević comparison is threefold. First, a reduced number of cases permits further investigative depth, therefore increasing the reliability of data results (Chapter 4). Second, spanning dissimilar Iraqi and Serbian political cultures, the behavioural parallels observed reinforce the trait-behaviour nexus (Figure 1) across geographical ‘space’ – therefore ‘de-provincialising’ source data (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Almond, 2000; Kocka, 2003). This is evinced through genocidal repression parallels, bolstering the focal contention that individual psychology propels action (Hermann, 1980a; Byman and Pollack, 2001). Finally, as a ‘variable oriented comparative’, this comparison involves dictatorial behaviour cases occupying equivalent periods in time (last two decades of the twentieth-century), therefore ensuring the constance of one variable to deliver ‘valid’ data insights (Ragin, 1987).
Overall, this thesis seeks to enrich existing perspectives on dictator psychology and the trait-behaviour nexus by associating existing ‘malignant narcissism’ theories with an original formulation of combined LTA trait scores; this culminates in key research question (Figure 1) solutions. First, Chapter 2 surveys and explicates pertinent literature, identifying gaps to be redressed by this investigation’s research questions. Second, Chapter 3 presents a comparative methodological framework – predicated upon interpretivist considerations – to obtain and apply data to psychological examinations of Hussein and Milošević (Anfal and Srebrenica). This framework encompasses 100 primary transcripts (50 Hussein/50 Milošević), processed by ‘Profiler Plus’ software to generate LTA content analysis and quantitative trait scores. Third, Chapter 4 depicts the empirical data (LTA trait scores) procured via this paper’s research methodology, juxtaposed with hypothesised results and secondary profile theorists. Fourth, Chapter 5 discusses the alignment and discrepancies across hypothesised and obtained trait scores to spotlight ‘malignant narcissism’, ‘perception-adjustment’, and the underpinning trait-behaviour nexus of both leaders. Finally, in Chapter 6, this discussion will be considered thematically, with concluding summations on the design, realisation, and academic significance of the collective investigation.
Chapter 2 – Literature Review

This literature review explicates interdisciplinary assumptions underpinning research of ‘malignant narcissism’, dictator psychology, and the trait-behaviour nexus (Figure 2).

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<tr>
<th>Theoretical Application</th>
<th>Key Literature</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>ii. Critique of Content Analysis: Strack (2005); Millon (1990); Millon and Davis (2000).</td>
<td>Critique of content analysis citing 'collateral information’ based research.</td>
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<td>3. Paranoia Paradox</td>
<td>i. 'Dictator Dilemma': Wintrobe (2000).</td>
<td>Dictatorial paranoia causes insecurity once power is obtained.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ii. 'Perception-Adjustment': Bandura (1999); Festinger (1957); Kelman (1973).</td>
<td>The process of behavioral legitimisation to combat dissonance intrinsic to dictator psychology.</td>
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Figure 2. ‘Thematic Survey of Key Literature’ – Author.
Section 2.1. contextualises psychological discourse surrounding personality analysis. Next, Section 2.2. highlights Hermann’s (1980a) LTA. Section 2.3. explores research surrounding the narcissistic condition, with the subcomponent of ‘malignant narcissism’ (paranoia, grandiosity, and defective superego) linked to dictator psychology. Further, Section 2.4. focalises Wintrobe’s (2000) ‘Dictator’s Dilemma’ to emphasise dictator paranoia. Section 2.5. introduces the role of psychological ‘perception-adjustment’ before key secondary personality profiles are surveyed in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7. welds personality traits and political behaviour, pinpointing the ‘gaps’ in the literature to be addressed by this thesis.

2.1. Contextual Overview

Personality analysis first secured academic recognition with the psychoanalytical expositions of Freud (1914/1959, 1920/2012) in the early twentieth-century. Advancing these seminal explorations, Lasswell’s (1930) assembly of political motivations to activity broadened the academic arena, inspiring the emergence of twentieth century political psychobiographies (Lukacs, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1998; George and George, 1956; Erikson, 1958). Since the onset of the twenty-first century, this academic domain has solidified its validity through consensus surrounding personality traits (Huddy et al., 2013). Whilst Machiavelli (1505/1908) signified “an early precursor of personality-in-politics inquiry”, the founding of the ‘International Society of Political Psychology’ in 1978 established the discipline within academic spheres (Strack, 2005: 198). Nonetheless, investigations connecting psychology and politics prefaced this development, reflecting the growing interest around political psychology’s contributions (Wallas, 1908; Lasswell, 1930, 1948; Eysenck, 1954/1999; Greenstein, 1969; Strack, 2005).
2.2. Exploring the Trait-Behaviour Nexus


Analysing “45 heads of government”, Hermann (1980a) enriched existing analyses underpinned by solely empirical foci and extended behavioural (aggressive/conciliatory) categories (Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Rankin and Quarrick, 1964; Henderson, 1980; Johnston et al., 1980). This expansion encompassed seven LTA traits: belief in ability to control events; need for power; self-confidence; conceptual complexity; ingroup bias; distrust of others; task focus (Hermann, 1980a; 1999). Critically, by demystifying how leaders’ personality traits illuminate their underlying behaviour, this served as a foundation for further research (Bass, 1981; Walker, 1983; Snyder, 1987; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Winter et al., 1991; Suedfeld, 1992; Winter, 1992, in Singer and Hudson, 1992; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998). Warranting this investigation’s focus, Hermann (1980a: 9) enriches “interpretations of […] strategies they [leaders] use” but is constrained by

Extending analysis into Iraq and Serbia with further secondary “collateral information” profiles, inherent disparities in political culture reinforce the validity of this paper’s trait-behaviour nexus to remedy these limitations (Strack, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999; Snyder, 2000; Cohen, 2001; LeBor, 2002; Sell, 2002; Ramet, 2003; Post, 2005). Specifically, the secondary works of Post (2005), Post and Panis (2005), and Doder and Branson (1999) indicate ‘perception-adjustment’, advancing Hermann’s (1980a; 1999) LTA framework validity through qualitative (interpretivism – Chapter 3.) personality profiling of Hussein and Milošević (Strack, 2005).

2.3. Malignant Narcissism: The Root of Dictatorial Behaviour?

Magnifying the trait-behaviour nexus to account for autocratic structures, this paper posits that dictatorial leaders possess ‘malignant narcissism’ constituting “not only the self-inflation of all narcissistic types, but also greater aggression and deficiency in his superego development” (Post, 1993: 113; Glad, 2002: 21). Particularly, the notions of defective ego, “grandiose” self-conception, and “paranoia”, are central to this thesis’ political behaviour remit (Glad, 2002: 2).

Significantly, Glad (2002: 1) developed this literature by exploring ‘malignant narcissist’ leaders and their “severe superego deficiencies” (Tucker, 1990; Robins and Post, 1997). Bolstering this paper’s acknowledgements of paranoia and ‘perception-adjustment’, Glad (2002:1) states: “[malignant narcissists] may have some advantages in rising to power […] once he has consolidated his position his reality-testing capacities diminish [and] paranoid
defences become more exaggerated” (Festinger, 1957; Bandura, 1999). Furthermore, Glad’s (2002) depiction of dictators aligns with Hermann’s (1980a: 12, 13) evaluation of political outcomes resulting from personality traits (Kernberg, 1998, in Ronningstam, 1998; Houlcroft et al., 2012; Glad, 2002). This is reflected within the observation of the “need to manipulate and control […] suspiciousness of others” characteristics (Hermann, 1980a: 11, 12). Critically, this investigation’s theoretical propositions are reinforced by Glad’s (2002) categorisation of dictatorial leaders as ‘malignant narcissists’ (Figure 3; Waite, 1977; Volkan, 1988; Tucker, 1990; Post, 1991 and 1993; Hershman and Lieb, 1994).

![Psychological Syndromes](image)

**Psychological Traits**
2. Underlying feelings of inferiority and defensiveness.
3. Deficient super-ego development; deficient grounding in shared values and genuine human relationships.
4. Paranoia (splitting and projection upon an enemy) as a major defense.
5. Poor impulse control.

**Behavioral Manifestations in the Tyrant**
1. Grandiose self-presentation and projects.
2. Use of power to support grandiose image and curtail negative feedback.*
3. Ruthless behavior; ease in the employment of antisocial and cruel tactics as needed.
4. Aggression vs. an external and/or domestic "enemy.'
5. Erratic behavior, contradictory orders.

**Power and the Malignant Narcissist: Interactive Effects**
1. Grandiosity and ability to employ antisocial tactics provide advantages in securing political power in certain situations.
2. Political power used to buttress grandiose self image, defend against external criticism, provide company, bolster splitting and paranoidic defense.
3. But consolidation of absolute power for the malignant narcissist is apt to lead to a vicious cycle:
   a. Orchestrated adulation and friendships feel false.
   b. Grandiose plans lead to rash behavior; this and ruthless political tactics create new enemies, other impediments to success.
   c. Project over-reach and creation of new enemies leads to increasing vulnerability, a deepening of the paranoidic defense, and volatility in behavior.

Figure 3. ‘The Paradox of the Tyrant’ – Glad, 2002.
The conclusions of Glad’s (2002: 6) ‘The Paradox of the Tyrant’ (Figure 3.) – asserting that there are “self-defeating tendencies” – strengthen a central proposition of this thesis: dictator behaviour is propelled by paranoia, grandiosity, and misjudgement of environment (defective superego). Nevertheless, whilst echoed by Kets de Vries and Miller (1985), Hermann (1980a), and Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006: 618), Glad’s (2002: 6) assertion that “tyrants” tend to “overreach in […] designs for aggrandisement” due to “egotistical needs for power and admiration”, is open to critique. Chapter 3.’s hypotheses instead contend that ‘malignant narcissists’ possess low desires for power, rising to positions of political authority via paranoia and belief in self-exceptionalism. Correspondingly, this thesis adjusts Glad’s (2002:6) model of “malignant narcissism” traits to indicate that dictator personalities hold high self-esteem. Finally, Glad (2002:1) asserts that political power can “buttress” a “grandiose self-image”, “defend against external criticism”, “provide company, bolster splitting, and paranoiac defence”. However, of these stipulations, Chapter 5. solely evidences power as a tool satiating the paranoia and grandiosity (self-esteem) of Hussein and Milošević. Preceding Glad (2002), Post’s (1993) seminal contribution was influenced by the principal studies of Freud (1914/1959; 1920/2012), Kohut (1971, 1977, 1978, 1984), Kernberg (1975), Volkan (1984,1988), Strozier (1983, in Goldberg, 1983) and Zonis (1991), and impacted Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006), and Weeks (2012). Offering significant insight into ‘malignant narcissism’ and political outcomes, Post’s (1993) observations of narcissists’ overestimation of self-ability furthers Hermann’s (1980a) cognitive perspective of belief systems.

Adopting a clinical summation of “Narcissistic Personality Disorder”, Post (1993: 100) emphasises a juxtaposition of “grandiose fantasies of power” or “glorious ambition” with “hypersensitivity to criticism”, “lack of empathy”, “self-esteem” and a “need for constant attention and admiration” (American Psychiatric Association, 1988; Rosenthal and Pittinsky,
2006). With both high self-conception and “sense of special unworthiness”, Post’s (1993: 100, 102, 103) analysis parallels Glad (2002), proposing that “fantasies” of grandiosity are a primary motivation of narcissism – “a search for recognition and adulation” that causes individuals to pursue powerful political positions.


Moreover, Post (1993) relates to ‘perception-adjustment’ by affirming that narcissists craft ‘selfobject’ relationships to heighten the narcissist’s self-esteem (Kohut, 1971). Seconded by Vaknin (2010), Post (1993: 109) therefore asserts that narcissists have “surrounded [themselves] with sycophants”, causing them to be “totally out of touch with political reality”. Chapter 5.’s discussions align with this observation, countering only the assumption that this emerges from low self-esteem; characterised by Hussein and Milošević, paranoid distrust of others is instead discovered to propel this construction (Goldner-Vukov and Moore, 2000; Post and Panis, 2005). Second, Post (1993: 109, 114) cites “narcissistic rage” that intimidates subordinates and quells independent thought - emphasising how the “grandiose façade of the narcissist rests upon a foundation of insecurity” (Kohut, 1972; Kernberg, 1975). Again, this
investigation contends that paranoid distrust of others serves as the foundation for this “rage” (Post, 1993: 114). Congruently, crystallising this thesis’ theoretical premise and its connection to dictatorial ‘perception-adjustment’, Post (1993: 110) alludes to judgements and positions rapidly shifting “without a qualm of conscience […] as ‘circumstances change’” (Festinger, 1957; Kelman, 1973; Bandura, 1999). Such nuance is critical to Chapter 5’s discussion of paranoia and low belief in ability to control events traits that ultimately presage dictator fear of the adversary and extreme political action (Anfal, 1988; Srebrenica, 1995).

2.4. The Paranoia Paradox

Wintrobe (2000: 20, 24) conceptualises paranoia in dictators as a “Dictator’s Dilemma”, concurring with Chapter 5. that actions such as “violence”, policy “contrary to the material interests” of subjects, and “delight in the exercise of power [servitude imposed]” stem from paranoia: “the tyrant could trust no one, not even those closest to him” (Veyne, 1990: 45). This aligns with Hermann (1980a), Glad (2002), second personality profiles based on “collateral information”, and this paper’s discussion (Strack, 2005: 198; Post and Panis, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999). However, Post’s (1993: 109) supposition of trust – with narcissistic leaders trusting an inner circle of “selfobject sycophants” – contradicts Wintrobe’s (2000) analysis of dictators. A theoretical divergence is thus caused by Post’s (1993) narcissistic leader focus, and Wintrobe’s (2000) extensive dictator evidence base across space and time (Ancient Rome, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, South Africa, and Chile). Significantly, Wintrobe’s (2000) source base bolsters the cross-cultural parallels proposed by this paper’s diagnosis of Hussein and Milošević. In addition, whilst Wintrobe (2000) echoes Glad (2002) and Post (1993) – that “the more power dictators have, the more insecure they are” – he asserts that this is induced by the “absence of a legitimate, regularised procedure for the dictator’s removal

2.5. The Defective Superego and ‘Perception-Adjustment’

Respectively, the notions of ‘defective superego’ and ‘perception-adjustment’ are significant for their influence over the individual’s misreading of environmental cues, and role in permitting extreme and unwarranted modes of behaviour (Festinger, 1957; Kelman, 1973; Bandura, 1999; Huttenbach, 1999, in Chorbajian and Shirinian, 1999; Baum, 2008; Monroe, 2008). Although the psychoanalytical field is divided over the utility of the Freudian superego concept, its metaphorical symbolism of “the inner judge” and “ethical-moral ego” signifies its relevant within investigations surrounding the amoral extremities of dictator behaviour (Freud, 1914/1959; Brenner, 2002; Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1996; Wurmser, 2003; Kant, 1797-1798/1983, in Wurmser, 2003; Roth, 2001). Aligning with Glad’s (2002) assessment (Figure 3.), this thesis contends that “deficient superego development” results in a defective superego and subsequent misinterpretation of environmental cues; furthered by ‘perception-adjustment, this legitimises extreme actions at a conscious and subconscious level to reduce cognitive dissonance (Freud, 1920/2012; Festinger, 1957; Kernberg, 1998, in Ronningstam, 1998; Bandura, 1999; Glad, 2002; Houlcroft et al., 2012).

as arising from “the cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one”, therefore advocating safeguards to “uphold compassionate behaviour and renounce cruelty”. However, this proposal is inconsistent when viewed in conjunction with both Bandura’s (1999: 193) first imperative of “humane personal standards”, and this research’s premise that extreme action is adopted from traits and ‘perception-adjustment’ legitimacy. Beyond this, displacement of responsibility is of considerable importance (Milgram, 1974; Bandura, 1999). Bandura (1999: 196) demystifies how authority structures succeed in “obscuring or minimising the agentive role in the harm one causes”, highlighting the ‘dehumanisation’ and ‘attribution of blame’ of ‘perception-adjustment’. Dictators – the apex of such structures – are thus conveyed as employing this process through belief in the morality of personal actions (Bandura, 1999: 200, 203; Post, 1993).

From the perspective of Glad (2002) and Post (1993), ‘malignant narcissism’ thus detracts ‘blame’ from the dictator and renders others as threatening (paranoia) – culminating in unaccountability and violent inclinations to quell perceived ‘threats’. Finally, Bandura’s (1999: 207) conclusions mirror Chapter 5, stating that “the massive threats to human welfare stem mainly from deliberate acts of principle rather than from unrestrained acts of impulse”. Here, Bandura (1999) alludes to a central tenet of Post (1993) that dictators alter perceptions in response to circumstance, therefore attributing actions to rational ‘morality’ and environmental cues filtered through a defective superego (Post, 1993). Overall, this results in contextual adjustment of principles, enabling political action to align with reformed principles.

2.6. Secondary Profiles: Existing Stances on Hussein and Milošević

Whilst the discussed literature delivers a theoretical foundation for the psychological analysis of dictators, a comprehensive psychological investigation warrants specific
recognition of existing stances surrounding Hussein and Milošević. Beyond Post’s (1993) contributions to narcissism theory, his personality profile of Hussein identifies a “malignant narcissist” psychology from behavioural characteristics (Post, 1991: 283, 1995). With “collateral information” – “direct observations from multiple [close] sources” – utilised to inform this diagnosis, Post’s (1991; 1995) Hussein profiles benefit the intentions of this investigation’s dualistic analysis (Strack, 2005: 198). Similarly, Post and Panis’ (2005) examination of their “courtroom conduct” advances this, underscoring key psychological parallels (“personalities and political behaviour”) of ‘malignant narcissism’ (manipulation of surrounding and dismissal of realities) between Hussein and Milošević (Post and Panis, 2005: 823; Strack, 2005: 198). Finally, through a “collateral-information” based profile, the contributions of Doder and Branson (1999) elucidate the implications of Milošević’s experiences on personal dictator psychology (Strack, 2005: 198). As discussed in Chapter 3., alongside wider consultation of secondary personality profiles, reference to such secondary contributions advances this paper’s investigative validity by remedying the methodological limitations of primary content analysis (Snyder, 2000; Cohen, 2001; LeBor, 2002; Sell, 2002; Ramet, 2003; Shaw, 2003; Winter, 2005, in Post, 2005; Weintraub, 2005, in Post, 2005).
2.7. Gaps in the Literature

Figure 4. ‘Dictator Psychology: Explaining Extreme Behaviour’ – Author.

Existing literature surrounding the trait-behaviour nexus outlines its strong correlation and potential for further analytical application (Rankin and Quarrick, 1964; Barber, 1965; Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Falkowski, 1978; Hermann, 1974, in Rosenau, 1974; Henderson, 1980; Johnston et al., 1980; Byman and Pollack, 2001). Specifically, Hermann’s (1980a) emphasis on leader personality and foreign policy accentuates the relevance of surveying individual characteristics, with Glad (2002) and Post (1993) reinforcing this through narcissistic behavioural manifestations. As discussed, Wintrobe (2000) furthers this through observations of paranoia and autocratic behaviour; Bandura’s (1999) indication of ‘perception-adjustment’ additionally underpins this nexus by evincing the translation of internal motivations into justified action.
Nevertheless, comparative critique illustrates the unexplored analytical gap that my research seeks to redress within Figure 4’s model. In particular, the texts’ outline of ‘malignant narcissism’ warrants revision when applied to dictatorships; remedying this, my research advocates the interrelation of paranoia, grandiosity, defective superego, and ‘perception-adjustment’ when explaining extreme political behaviour (Anfal and Srebrenica). Ultimately, Chapter 3. advocates the formation of an interpretivist model that combines aspects of ‘malignant narcissism’ and ‘perception-adjustment’ with a specific combination of LTA trait scores to better demystify dictatorial behaviour (Figure 4). Review of the existing literature spotlights the necessity for research that can advance understanding of the personality-behaviour interaction. By developing existing interdisciplinary perspectives, this thesis therefore seeks to yield further academic insight of dictatorial outputs.
Chapter 3 – Design and Methodology

This chapter outlines the dualist methodology deployed to “generate research materials” that satisfy this thesis’ key research questions in Figure 1. (Whatmore, 2003). First, Section 3.1. charts this paper’s data selection, spotlighting justifications for comparative investigation of the leaders’ psychology. Informed by this remit, Section 3.2. describes the analytical research methods adopted, appraising both content analysis and secondary perspectives. Finally, Section 3.3. conceptualises hypotheses across trait (LTA) scores, providing a comparative framework for the obtained results in Chapter 5.

3.1. Data Selection

Obtaining “spontaneous” information for content analysis is key (Hermann, 1999: 2, 1980a, 1986; Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Winter et al., 1991). With interviews perceived as more spontaneous than speeches, LTA content prioritised this source, reverting to speeches when interviews were unobtainable. For accuracy, these data sources sampled from the month of presidential assumption to within six to nine months preceding the selected focal episode of violence (17th July, 1979 – 29th August, 1987 for Hussein; 9th May, 1989 – 20th October, 1994 for Milošević). Collectively, 68,343 words were analysed for Milošević (60,726 gathered from 45 interviews and 7,617 from 5 speeches), and 137,897 words were analysed for Hussein (48,270 gathered from 16 interviews and 65,437 gathered from 34 speeches)¹. Critically, spanning leaders’ tenures, this data range augments profile construction whilst averting coverage of “crisis behaviour”; here, crises cause leaders to “experience stress”, thereby accentuating false trait-profiles (Hermann, 1999: 38). Concordant with this data selection, ‘collateral information’ incorporating analysis of 26 secondary personality profiles elevates investigative validity and extends qualitative data scope (Post, 2005; Post and Panis, 2005;

¹ Full details for all one-hundred samples are located in Appendices A (Hussein) and B (Milošević).
Social scientific comparative data selections are imperative for documenting “cross-societal” patterns via the “de-provincialising” of data (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Kocka, 2003: 39; Ragin, 1987; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1992). With selections of Hussein and Milošević, a ‘variable oriented comparative’ approach is necessitated; this maintains a constant variable (time) across two distinct cases to remedy the ‘incommensurability’ of corresponding cultures, thereby enabling observation of psychological commonality across space (Ragin, 1987; Keane, 2005: 223; Povinelli, 2001).

3.2. Methodological Rationale – A Dualist Approach

Based on this qualitative data selection, a dualistic methodology across primary LTA ratings and secondary profiling is chosen to inform this paper’s hypotheses (Section 3.2.) and key research questions (Figure 1.). Supporting this position, Strack (2005: 198) challenges a reliance on “content analysis of speeches and published interviews” when “direct observations from multiple sources [collateral information]” exist “in the public record”. Evaluation of ‘collateral information’-based secondary research therefore elevates investigative validity via “the patterning of personality variables ‘across the entire matrix of the person’” (Strack, 2005: 200; Millon and Davis, 2000: 65, in Strack, 2005: 200). From the primary data perspective, LTA profiling presents a reliable form of content analysis, with Hermann (1999) citing a 0.84 average correlation with ‘collateral information’-based results (Strack, 2005). To further reliability, this paper investigation utilises Young’s computerised ‘Profiler Plus’ software to conduct primary LTA analysis with reduced human error and subjectivity. Collectively, this dualist methodology offers a systematic quantitative coding process for each trait across
primary and secondary research: data “familiarisation”; code “generation”; thematic search; review; definition; evaluation of amalgamated data (Figure 7; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Strack, 2005; Hermann, 1999).

Whilst computerised content analysis (‘Profiler Plus’) produces data quantitatively, interpretivist evaluation of secondary research critiques positivist assumptions surrounding the existence of objective meaning “independently of consciousness” (Collins, 2010). Nevertheless, Payne’s (1951) disbelief that reducing “the complex matter of people’s attitudes […] to some simple wording that will not bias the returns” emphasises an intrinsic investigative drawback of interpretivism (Dudovskiy, 2016). This impact is mitigated through the dualist approach combining ‘small-N’ and ‘large-N’ features – interweaving quantitative content analysis results (100 transcripts computerised by ‘Profiler Plus’) with qualitative evaluation of secondary materials (Jordan et al., 2011; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). Further, this method resolves Goldthorpe (1991; 1997) and Kiser and Hechter’s (1991; 1998) consternation surrounding comparative research; here, ‘Profiler Plus’ content analysis safeguards against overreliance on secondary sources’ “explanatory principles”.

Significantly, epitomising the pinnacle of Hussein and Milošević’s extremity, the Anfal (1988) and Srebrenica (1995) genocides are selected to assist dualistic profile construction of personality traits. First, the Anfal “extermination campaign” (1988) exemplifies extreme brutality with “at least 50,000 Kurdish civilians” killed and “2000 villages destroyed” (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 1; Hughes, 2003). As explored in Chapter 5., this case most strongly emphasises Hussein’s personality traits (LTA) with transgression of anti-genocide and chemical weapons U.N. laws, “gross violations of human rights”, mass executions, imprisonment, and displacement (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 1). Second, within Milošević’s
advocation of a nationalist ‘Greater Serbia’, the Srebrenica massacre (1995) of the Bosnian Muslim population mirrored Hussein’s objective of purging the Kurds from Iraq (Stevanovic and Filipovic, 2004; Post and Panis, 2005; Vladisavljevik, 2004). Characterising “the worst massacre in Europe since World War II”, Srebrenica was similarly “cleansed” with the mass execution of “eight thousand Bosniaks” and “forced transfer of women and children” (Brunborg, et al., 2003: 229; Delpla et al., 2012:1; Vollen, 2001: 336). Overall, both cases expose the ‘malignant narcissism’ propelling dictator behaviour with ‘perception-adjustment’ necessary to legitimise genocidal extremity of response (Figure 4). Situated within the wider conflicts of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and Bosnian War (1992-1995), this buttresses the ability of data analysis to decipher dictator inclinations to extremity in comparable contexts.

3.3. Data Analysis Framework and Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Belief in Ability to Control Events</th>
<th>Need for Power</th>
<th>Self-Confidence</th>
<th>Conceptual Complexity</th>
<th>Ingroup Bias</th>
<th>Distrust of Others</th>
<th>Task Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milošević</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. ‘Hypotheses: LTA Trait Scores for Hussein and Milošević’ – Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score Type</th>
<th>Belief in Ability to Control Events</th>
<th>Need for Power</th>
<th>Self-Confidence</th>
<th>Conceptual Complexity</th>
<th>Ingroup Bias</th>
<th>Distrust of Others</th>
<th>Task Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. ‘LTA Average Norming Group Scores’ – Author; Hermann (1999).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Mode of Measurement</th>
<th>High-Scoring Leaders</th>
<th>Low-Scoring Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Control Over Events</td>
<td>Verbs indicating “responsibility” for “action”.</td>
<td>Prefer “control over decision making and implementation” to compromise.</td>
<td>Reactive; risk-averse; likely to “shift blame”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Power</td>
<td>Verbs indicating “forceful action”; “endeavours to impress”.</td>
<td>“Highly machiavellian”. Utilise rules and charisma to mask exploitative leadership.</td>
<td>Prioritise group goals; build morale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Confidence</td>
<td>Personal pronouns (my, myself, I, me, and mine).</td>
<td>Fixed opinions; new information is “ignored or transformed […] to maintain consistency in behaviour”.</td>
<td>Easily manipulated by contextual changes; inconsistent behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual Complexity</td>
<td>Words implying flexibility/rigidity: i.e. “approximately, possibility”; “absolutely, without a doubt”.</td>
<td>Consider a wide range of possibilities and “seek a variety of perspectives”.</td>
<td>Highly structured world-view; act prior to considering or searching for further information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup Bias</td>
<td>Modifiers that are “favourable”, suggest “strength” or “group honour and identity”.</td>
<td>Desire distinct group identity; black-and-white world-view; “friends and enemies” categories.</td>
<td>Flexibly classify actors as “we/them”; favour diplomacy and interpersonal interaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of Others</td>
<td>Nouns/noun phrases referring to other persons/groups.</td>
<td>Suspicious; “hypersensitive to criticism”. High scores convey paranoia.</td>
<td>Trust/distrust is informed by experience and knowledge; realistic judgement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task focus</td>
<td>“Task-oriented words relative to the total number of task and group-maintenance words”.</td>
<td>Prioritise group goals; this focus motivates the pursuit of leadership. “Task masters”; problem-focused world view, perceiving their group as responsible for creating solutions. Prioritise issues over individuals.</td>
<td>Relationship establishment and management prioritised; “loyalty” and “morale” are key. Prioritise the group over the common objective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. ‘LTA Content Analysis’ – Author; Hermann (1999); Hermann and Milburn (1977).
Based on the content analysis (‘Profiler Plus’) component of the discussed dualistic approach, this paper theorises a correlation between ‘malignant narcissism’ and hypothesised LTA scores (Figure 5). To clarify the conversion of numerical scores to low/moderate/high categories, results must match or fall below the normative scores drawn from Hermann’s (1999) investigation of 87 heads of state and 122 political leaders (Figure 6.). This combination of trait scores is predicted to manifest within secondary profiles of Hussein and Milošević’s severe violence and incongruent responses to environmental cues (Anfal and Srebrenica). Coded results for each trait are therefore analysed independently and comparatively to illuminate key themes and “patterns” informing further assumptions of leader characteristics (Figure 7.; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 246). In summary, whilst ‘belief in control’, ‘need for power’, and ‘task focus’ are hypothesised autonomously, scores for ‘self-confidence’, ‘conceptual complexity’, ‘ingroup bias’, and ‘distrust of others’ are of greater use to the research questions (Figure 1) through a comparative lens.

3.3.1. Hypothesis – Belief in Control Over Events: Low

The leaders are predicted to score lowly in this trait, based upon Hermann’s (1999) assertions that high-scoring leaders are risk-averse and reactive (Figure 5., Figure 7.). As evidenced by secondary profiles, neither leader demonstrated such characteristics, pursuing extreme solutions to detected challenges and absolute control over decision-making (Hermann, 1999; Alani, 2000; Post, 2005).

3.3.2. Hypothesis – Need for Power: Low

Although Hermann (1999) outlines low-scoring individuals as group-goal orientated, this investigation predicts that Hussein and Milošević will be low-scoring; this results from the interrelation of low belief in control over events and high distrust of others with low need for
power, forging paranoia that incentivises the pursuit to positions of power. Hermann’s (1999) illustration of high-scoring individuals for this trait strengthens this position; whilst charisma masks exploitation, unconcealed exploitation and brutality within both leaders’ regimes is observed (Figure 7.) (Human Rights Watch, 1993; Brunborg et al., 2003).

3.3.3. Hypothesis – Task Focus: High

The problem-focused world-view of high task focussed individuals bolsters the prediction that both leaders score highly (Figure 7., Figure 5.). Notwithstanding Hermann’s (1999) proposal that group goals motivate high task focussed individuals to leadership, the paranoia of high distrust overwhelms this consideration by framing extreme behaviour as effective (Anfal and Srebrenica) (Figure 7.).

3.3.4. Hypothesis – Self-Confidence and Conceptual Complexity: High; Low

A comparative examination of self-confidence and conceptual complexity scores illustrates whether an individual is open to new interpretations of their environment, or closed to environmental pressures; if closed, individuals are prone to ‘perception-adjustment’ and thus reinterpret information to “fit their view of the world” (Ziller et al., 1977, in Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Hermann, 1999: 18). Leaders whose conceptual complexity scores are lower than scores for self-confidence reflect the secondary profiles of Hussein and Milošević that this hypothesis (high; low) aligns with (Figure 5.; Post and Panis, 2005; Post, 1991; Al-Marashi, 2003; Blum et al., 2008; Davis, 2006). Such leaders are inflexible to environmental cues, “reinterpreting” the “environment”, and facilitating control over decision-making (Figure 7.; Hermann, 1999: 18).
3.3.5. Hypothesis – Ingroup Bias and Distrust of Others: Low; High

These two traits convey a leader’s “way of approaching the world”, illustrating the confrontationality of their state, their likelihood to adopt initiatives, and “when they are likely to engage in economic sanctions and military interventions” (Figure 7.; Hermann, 1999: 27; Levine and Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977, in Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Kelman 1983; Vasquez, 1993; Snyder, 1991; Hagan, 1994, 1995, in Neak et al., 1995; Hermann and Kegley, 1995).Aligning with my hypotheses, low-high scores indicate “vigilant” leaders – reflecting the wariness of both leaders towards the Kurdish and Bosnian Muslim populations (Figure 5.) (Hermann, 1999: 28; Dawisha, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005). Moreover, Hermann’s (1999) assertion that low ingroup bias denotes flexible classification of actors as ‘we/them’ corresponds with the prediction that Hussein and Milošević select and switch alignment with others based on pragmatic security benefits (Figure 7.; Dawisha, 1999; Sassoon, 2011). Finally, the coupling of high distrust scores to paranoia upholds the hypothesised high scores for both leaders (Figure 7.; Figure 5.; Hermann, 1999).
Chapter 4 – Results

Through comparison with the norming group LTA scores provided by Hermann (1999), Hussein and Milošević’s average results are identified into low/moderate/high groupings.² This categorisation permits comparison with the hypothesised results, facilitating critique and evaluation of the investigative method whilst encouraging comparison with ‘collateral information’-based secondary research. The results of this investigation are presented in Figure 9., with a comparison to norming group scores (Figure 6.) graphed in Figure 8. to support interpretation of results. Additionally, Figure 9. presents theoretical groupings of secondary research, highlighting the nature of the leaders’ depictions within secondary profiles and summarising their implied trait scores.

![LTA Scores: Hussein and Milošević Compared with Norming Groups](image)

**Figure 8. ‘Score Comparison: Average LTA Scores: Hussein, Milošević, and Norming Comparison Group’ – Author and Herman (1999).**

² Appendix A; Appendix B.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Predicted Scores</th>
<th>Obtained Scores: Hussein</th>
<th>Obtained Scores: Milošević</th>
<th>Secondary Literature: Scores and Key Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Control Over Events</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.4 (Moderate)</td>
<td>0.3 (Low)</td>
<td>Systematic rationalisation of extremity; doubt from trauma (low scores) (Post, 1991, 2005; Al-Marashi, 2002, 2003; Post and Panis, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999; Sell, 2016; Scharf, 2002; Blum et al., 2008; Davis, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Power</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.3 (Low)</td>
<td>0.3 (Low)</td>
<td>Pre-existing sense of power; extremity as protection (low scores) (Shaw, 2003; Ramet, 2003; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Post, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Confidence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.3 (Low)</td>
<td>0.6 (Moderate)</td>
<td>Grandiose self-conception; inappropriate conduct (high scores) (Doder and Branson, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual Complexity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.6 (High)</td>
<td>0.5 (Moderate)</td>
<td>Inappropriate conduct (low scores) (Doder and Branson, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup Bias</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.2 (Low)</td>
<td>0.2 (Low)</td>
<td>Pragmatism; distrust from trauma (low scores) (Post, 1993, 2003; Dawisha, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005; Sassoon, 2011; Black, 1993; Milutinovic, 2017; Doder and Branson, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of Others</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.2 (Low)</td>
<td>0.1 (Low)</td>
<td>Pragmatic relations and action; distrust from trauma (high scores) (Post, 1993, 2003; Dawisha, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005; Sassoon, 2011; Tournaye, 2003; Black, 1993; Milutinovic, 2017; Doder and Branson, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Focus</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.5 (Moderate)</td>
<td>0.6 (Moderate)</td>
<td>Protection of position (high scores) (Post and Panis, 2005; Vladisavljevik, 2004; Alani, 2000; Sell, 2003; Scharf, 2003, 2007; Peterson, 2007).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. ‘Thesis Results: Comparison of Milošević and Hussein’s Average LTA Scores’

– Author: Hermann (1999).
As displayed within Figure 9., the results of the LTA investigation present significant divergence from the hypothesised scores, whereas information supplied by secondary profiles demonstrates alignment.

**Need for Power:**

LTA results for this trait align with the hypothesised need for power scores. Predicted as low, both Milošević and Hussein’s results present a low score of 0.3. Similarly, secondary research results demonstrate the leaders as possessing low need for power.

**Ingroup Bias:**

LTA results for ingroup bias align with the predicted scores. Hypothesised as low, both Milošević and Hussein reflect low scores of 0.2. Correspondingly, secondary research emphasises low ingroup bias across both leaders.

**Belief in Control Over Events:**

The obtained LTA results of 0.4 (moderate) for Hussein and 0.3 (low) for Milošević reflect partial alignment with hypothesised scores, which were predicted low for both leaders. Contrastingly, secondary research results illustrate a low belief in control over events for both leaders, aligning fully with the hypothesised score.

**Conceptual Complexity:**

The LTA results for this trait present no alignment with hypothesised scores; predicted low scores are contrasted with an obtained high score (0.6) for Hussein, and moderate score (0.5) for Milošević. Nonetheless, adhering to the hypothesised score, secondary research conveys low conceptual complexity for both Hussein and Milošević.
**Self-Confidence:**

With hypothesised high scores, the low (0.3, Hussein) and moderate (0.6, Milošević) results obtained signify no alignment. Moreover, these results denote a significant gap of 0.3 between the scores of both leaders. However, corresponding with the hypotheses, secondary research contravenes these results, depicting significantly high self-confidence within both leaders.

**Distrust of Others:**

Fully diverging from predicted scores, the low LTA results of Hussein (0.2) and Milošević (0.1) present no alignment with the hypotheses. Supporting the hypotheses and contesting LTA results, high distrust of others is underscored within the secondary research evaluated.

**Task Focus:**

Finally, no alignment is seen across obtained LTA and predicted results for task focus, with hypothesised high scores contrasted with obtained moderate scores (0.5 for Hussein; 0.6 for Milošević). Nevertheless, bolstering the hypotheses, the leaders are described as possessing high task focus within the secondary profiles examined.

Overall, as explicated in Chapter 5., the results from LTA content analysis present a general trend of non-alignment with hypothesised scores, with 64.3% non-alignment compared to 35.7% alignment. Contrastingly, the results gleaned from secondary personality profiles present full alignment with this investigation’s hypotheses.
Chapter 5 – Discussion

Predicated upon the preceding three chapters surveying literature ‘gaps’, designing research methodologies, and depicting results, Chapter 5 provides detailed analyses and discussion of individual and comparative traits underpinning the dictator psychology of Hussein and Milošević.

5.1. Overview

Outlined in Chapter 3., the dualist investigative focus of this thesis is elucidated through an assessment of Hussein and Milošević’s LTA trait scores alongside secondary profiles based on ‘collateral information’. At a snapshot, with continuous reference to the hypotheses, genocidal episodes of extremity, and secondary profiles highlighting patterns of behaviour across the leaders’ tenures, discussion underscores the view that dictator psychology demonstrates ‘malignant narcissism’ and ‘perception-adjustment’.

First, analysis of information surrounding the leaders’ belief in control begins this discussion, spotlighting insecurity regarding perceived impotence within a structure of political challenges. Here, one key observation is that extreme behaviour – as witnessed within the Anfal and Srebrenica cases – evinces a low belief in control over events through its compensatory nature. Further, suspicion towards others is correspondingly central as such extremities are ostensibly provoked by the magnification of power inconsistencies to threats. Second, accordingly, distrust of others is examined, highlighting the intrinsic paranoia of ‘malignant narcissism’. Due to an observation of the characteristic developing when ingroup bias is lower than distrust of others scores, this section is combined with an analysis of ingroup bias (Hermann, 1999). Significantly, distrust visibly permeates the actions of dictators, manifesting in closed and inflexible behaviour. Third, Hermann’s (1999) assertion that individuals with
low-high scores for conceptual complexity and self-confidence will display such behaviour informs a discussion to scrutinise both traits. Fourth, informed by this section’s observations of dictators’ grandiosity, an examination of their need for power follows. Finally, from the analytical foundation of the above traits, task focus is evaluated to highlight the fundamental prioritisation of self-preservation. Overall, the alignment of secondary profile observations within my hypotheses supports the theoretical proposition of this dissertation – that the specified LTA trait combination is apparent within both leaders (Figure 4.). This conclusion is advanced by the incorporation of theoretical psychoanalytic and political psychology literature within this discussion.

5.2. Methodological Limitations

As analysed throughout this chapter’s trait discussions, incorporation of secondary personality profiles highlights the role of inherent data distortions affecting primary LTA results, thus serving to combat various content analysis limitations (Millon, 1990; Millon and Davis, 2000; Strack, 2005). Such limitations range across issues of self-presentation, encompassing rehearsed and tailored word-selection, the use of speech-writers, editing of interview and speech transcripts, and the uncertainty regarding the presence or extent of these issues within data analysed (Charteris-Black, 2018; Roberts, 1997; Bourdieu, 1991; Gleason, 2018). The significant proportion of speeches (68% speeches and 32% interviews for Hussein; 10% speeches and 90% interviews for Milošević) used to code for trait scores presents a significant risk of such distortions; whilst both forms of content are negatively affected by issues of rehearsal and self-presentation, interviews are regarded as spontaneous and therefore more accurate (Hermann, 1999, 1980a, 1986; Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Winter et al., 1991; Shütz, 1993; Gleason, 2018).³

³ Appendix A; Appendix B.
Moreover, whilst the computerisation of LTA content analysis (via ‘Profiler Plus’) elevates the reliability of this investigation’s content analysis, removing the space for human error, the linguistic limitations of this programme affect the accuracy of results. First, ‘Profiler Plus’ solely processes English and Spanish text – incurring issues surrounding lost nuance (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Prior to analysis, this can occur in instances where texts require translation, and additionally when selected texts were interviews or speeches delivered in English – neither the first language of Hussein nor Milošević. Regardless of fluency, texts delivered in a second language risk losing a degree of authentic expression due to elements of professionality, performance, discomfort or unfamiliarity obstructing expression (Harder, 1980; Marcos, 2018). Furthermore, the impact of formal linguistic education on the nature of an individual’s speech alongside affects vocabulary and tone; alongside this, the hindered ability of mental word-search caused by the anxiety that accompanies speaking in a second language (formal conditions), accentuates this methodological limitation (MacIntyre and Gardner, 1994).

Additionally, ‘collateral information’-based research further comprises methodological limitation with issues of human bias and memory errors (misremembering and confabulation) detracting from its overall research utility (Robins, 2016; Levine et al., 2009; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983; Mercer et al., 1977; Turnbull et al., 2004). Nevertheless, a combination of investigative methods in this thesis strives to remedy these issues through the respective benefits attained from both forms of research (Hermann, 1974, in Rosenau, 1974; 1999; Hermann and Milburn, 1977 Winter, 2005, in Post, 2005; Weintraub, 2005, in Post, 2005; Strack, 2005; Millon, 1990; Millon and Davis, 2000, in Strack, 2005; Greenstein, 1969).
5.3. Trait Discussion – Belief in Control Over Events

The secondary personality profiles examined support my hypothesis that both leaders possess a low belief in control over events, citing a systematic rationalisation of unwarranted extremity, its ruthless and irrational appearance, and the self-doubt that arises from trauma as a constructive trait factor (Post, 2005; Post and Panis, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999). Such themes will be sequentially analysed. Encapsulated at its pinnacle within the Anfal and Srebrenica crises – where the extremity of genocide was employed to quell inconsistencies in their political predominance – the idea that both leaders possessed little belief in control over events is reflected by the incongruence of reaction to environmental cues. Moreover, the extremity of their reactions towards minor challenges bolsters assumptions of ‘malignant narcissism’, highlighting the paranoia and defective superego underscoring ineffective interpretation of the external environment (Glad, 2002; Post, 1993).

Secondary personality profiles evince the leaders’ low belief in control over events through their systematic inclination towards extreme violence. Post’s (2005: 335) assertion that Hussein “explained the extremity of his actions as president of Iraq as necessary to achieve ‘subjective immunity’ against foreign plots and influences” epitomises this hypothesis by highlighting Hussein’s logic towards the Anfal genocide. Prioritising the protection of his political survival – additionally illuminated by his nepotistic governmental structure and pervasive security network – this statement illuminates how Hussein legitimised an act of genocide via belief in its necessity (Al-Marashi, 2002). This signifies a low belief in control over events through the perception that such extreme action was required to quell a minor inconsistency in his power. Aligning with the suggestion of systematic rationalisation and justification, Post and Panis’ (2005: 824) characterisation of Milošević as “cunning and ruthless” implies calculating leadership based on callous principles. These suggestions allude
to the use of ‘perception-adjustment’ to permit its continuation, whereby the legitimacy of action is bolstered through moral-disengagement and linguistic sanitisation (Bandura, 1999; Festinger, 1957; Kelman, 1973; Dutton, 2007; Bandura, 1999; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). Post (2005: 335) reinforces this point, stressing how such rationalisation underpinned a “lifelong pattern in which all actions are justified; alluding to the habitual use of ‘perception-adjustment’ in conjunction with incongruent responses to environmental cues, this perpetuated the systematic normalisation of extreme action.

Post and Panis’ (2005: 829) use of the term “rational calculator” for Hussein advances this evaluation and underscores the parallels between both leaders; here, the proposal that such merciless rationality created the impression of a “madman” underlines my proposal of ‘perception-adjustment’ (Post, 1991: 279). This is mirrored in the assessment of Milošević’s “cool ruthlessness” (Doder and Branson, 1999; Sell, 2016: 16; Scharf, 2002). Connoting apparent irrationality and unwarranted extremity, these terms allude to the external appearance created by the internal logic of both leaders’ ‘malignant narcissist’ traits. Critically, this reflects the paranoia and defective superego traits – misinforming behaviour through misinterpretation of the environment – propelling the adoption of extreme action. Moreover, the notion of self-doubt induced by trauma is evident within secondary profiles. For example, Post’s (2005: 337) analysis that Hussein was “a wounded self” with “profound self-doubt” highlights the foundation for a compensatory need to pursue extreme control due to an intrinsic sense of impotence. Referencing the trauma experienced in childhood, this evaluation additionally translates to the case of Milošević. Aligning with Post’s (2005: 337) logic, the “profound self-doubt” effects of trauma should also be visible within Milošević, who similarly experienced a traumatic childhood and early adulthood (Doder and Branson, 1999).
Fundamentally, whilst the Anfal and Srebrenica cases evoke extreme behaviour, their labels – “tathir”, meaning “purification” and “etniko ciscenj […] ciscenj prostor”, meaning “cleansing of the region […] cleansing the territory” – evince a low belief in control over events and palpable legitimisation of this action through ‘perception-adjustment’ (Al-Marashi, 2003: 5; Blum et al., 2008: 204; Davis, 2006). This highlights both leaders’ low belief in control over events by reflecting that the “rational” conclusion for was to deploy extreme violence towards a minor threat (Post and Panis, 2005: 829). Moreover, the fact that both regimes were engaged in larger conflicts when these genocides were enforced bolsters the notion of ‘perception-adjustment’ through the inherent place moral-disengagement and sanitisation of language occupies within contexts of war. Ultimately, beyond implying a perception of impotence vis-à-vis controlling events, the secondary profiles referenced illuminate the paranoia of ‘malignant narcissism’, strengthening this investigation’s theoretical proposition.

Evaluation of the LTA results, combined with these observations of secondary profiles, highlights the characteristic behaviour of both leaders as reflecting systematic extremism – with low belief in control over events a strong causal agent. Although the hypotheses of this investigation align with the insights offered by secondary profiles – predicting low scores for belief in control over events – the LTA results present a moderate score for Hussein (0.4). The low result for Milošević (0.3), however, is strengthened by secondary research based on ‘collateral information’, thus bolstering this hypotheses. Nevertheless, Hussein’s score warrants further investigation. As the evidence conveyed through secondary research asserts the low belief in control over events possessed by Hussein, critique of the methodological approach is warranted. The aforementioned data issues therefore occupy prime focus. With speeches constituting 68% of the data analysed for Hussein – compared to 10% for Milošević – a tenable explanation for Hussein’s moderate score surrounds the rehearsal and tailored word-
selection that are intrinsically linked to the self-presentation purpose of speeches (Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2001). Specifically, within speeches, word-selection would be tailored to mask a low belief in control over events in order to convey confidence and authority (Shamir, et al., 2018, in Katz, et al., 2018; Charteris-Black, 2018; Reyes, 2011; Boussofara, 2006). Whilst these issues should extend to interviews, the consensus within the field of content analysis asserts that interviews possess significantly higher degrees of spontaneity, therefore permitting greater accuracy in the construction of personality profiles. Collectively, however, the hypotheses are supported by secondary research conveying low belief in control over events for both leaders.

5.4. Trait Discussion – Ingroup Bias and Distrust of Others

Interlinked with a low belief in control over events, the hypothesised traits of low ingroup bias and high distrust of others find support within secondary personality profiles – despite conflict with LTA results. Whilst the LTA results partially align with my hypotheses, displaying low ingroup bias for both leaders (0.2 for Hussein; 0.2 for Milošević), the low results for distrust of others (0.2 for Hussein; 0.1 for Milošević) contravene the expected high scores. Nevertheless, supplementing the hypothesis of low ingroup bias by referencing the superficiality of dictator’s pragmatic alliances, the secondary profiles connote the intense distrust forged by experiences of trauma. Evaluation of these assertions is furthered through reference to the Anfal and Srebrenica cases, epitomising the combination of low ingroup bias with high distrust through these massacres. The interrelated paranoia of intense distrust and low ingroup bias, illustrated by these profiles, reiterates the central suggestion of dictators’ ‘malignant narcissism’.
The traits of ingroup bias and distrust of others are evaluated together for two reasons. First, interrelation. This thesis asserts that high distrust diminishes desire to represent and support an ingroup, due to the trust required for group identification (Cook et al., 2009). Second, due to the observation of high-low distrust of others and ingroup bias characteristics within the secondary profiles of both Hussein and Milošević (Hermann, 1999). Namely, these are outlined as “taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships”, whilst remaining “vigilant”. Such characteristics are imitated within the dictatorial style of constructing an inner circle, purging, and rotating individuals when an element of insurgency or criticism is detected (Post, 1993; Hermann, 1999; Dawisha, 1999; Wintrobe, 2000; Post and Panis, 2005; Sassoon, 2011). Moreover, the extremity of the Anfal and Srebrenica cases exposes these characteristics further. Here, vigilance is construed through the observation and inflation of the threat to the leaders’ political survival posed by the Kurds and Bosnian Muslims. Correspondingly, “taking advantage of opportunities” is symbolised through the assessment that for Hussein, Anfal was “the opportunity to bring to a climax its long-standing efforts to bring the Kurds to heel”; similarly, for Milošević, Srebrenica was the opportunity to exercise “intent to destroy Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica […] a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group” (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 1; Tournaye, 2003: 460).

Nonetheless, whilst the notion of “building relationships” is ostensibly absent from these cases, the secondary profiles depict the tactical use of inner circles and alliances in providing the foundations for focalised extremity (Anfal and Srebrenica) to be realised. This is supported by Anfal being largely orchestrated by Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, ergo accentuating the pragmatic nature of political inner circles (Kelly, 2007). Analogously, Srebrenica was enforced by Bosnian Serb “military commander” Ratko Mladić (Black, 1993; Kelly, 2007; Kent, 2005: 87; Bošković, 2011). Beyond facilitating the realisation of leaders’
aims, the pragmatism underpinning this mode of constructing inner circles is further reflected
within the plausible deniability that delegation of extreme action afforded both leaders. Whilst
al-Majid became colloquially known as “Ali Chemical” and “Ali Anfal”, evidence from
Milošević’s trial reflects claims that Milošević occupied a “peacemaker role”, shifting
culpability towards Mladić (Black, 1993: 52; Milutinovic, 2017: 1).

Furthering insights into the political survival propelling high distrust of others and low
ingroup bias, the assessments that Milošević and Hussein’s paranoia stemmed from their
experience of trauma is focalised (Doder and Branson, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005). As Doder
and Branson (1999: 5) note, the “traumatic events” of Milošević’s youth – experiencing
paternal abandonment, destitution, and the dual suicides of his mother and uncle – led to his
“survival instinct” being “reinforced”. This alludes to the intense distrust of others and
interlinked shunning of group identification hypothesised by this investigation. Moreover, such
familial trauma, paralleled in Hussein’s youth by his mother’s rejection of him, attempted
suicide, and the psychological and physical abuse inflicted by his stepfather, reinforces the
hypothesis of dictatorial extremity being propelled by trait similarities constituting ‘malignant
narcissism’ (Post and Panis, 2005).

An example of this combination of high distrust with low ingroup bias is the “massive
bunker […] beneath the presidential palace […] designed to withstand all but a direct nuclear
blast” (Post, 2003, in Post and Panis, 2005: 828). Representing the “architectural motif for […]
his political psychology” – defined as a “siege state, ready to be attacked, ready to defend” –
this secondary profile observation encapsulates the central assertion of ‘malignant narcissism’s
paranoia, generated through high distrust, consequent low ingroup bias, and the effects of a
defective superego. This is supported by the consensus that trauma experienced during
formative stages can wreak significant impacts on personality developments. For instance, ‘malignant narcissism’: developing from “disrupted early childhoods” that feature “unresolved grief of their mothers […] “separations with multiple parental figures”, hatred towards paternal figures, and abuse by paternal figures that “probably led to their paranoia” (Goldner-Vukov and Moore, 2010: 397). Correspondingly, the assertion that resultantly, “for the rest of his life [Milošević] would always be on guard”, bolsters this paper’s proposition that the paranoia witnessed in political behaviour exhibits distress (Doder and Branson, 1999: 5).

The alignment of secondary personality profiles and obtained LTA results with hypothesised distrust of others and ingroup bias scores strengthens the validity of the predictions. Consequently, the discrepancy between predicted and actual LTA results for distrust of others can be explained by returning to issues surrounding methodological approach and data use. To demonstrate strength and bolster authority, leaders’ self-presentation within speeches and interviews strives to appear confident and secure (Shamir, et al., 2018, in Katz, et al., 2018; Charteris-Black, 2018; Reyes, 2011; Boussofara, 2006; Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2010). Nonetheless, according to Hermann’s (1999) assertions regarding the superior spontaneity of interview content, compared to Milošević, the greater proportion of speeches used for Hussein indicate that Hussein’s scores for distrust of others should be lower. Examination of the LTA scores confirms that – whilst both leaders score lowly for distrust of others, reinforcing the idea of rehearsed content – Hussein’s score is 0.2 compared to Milošević’s lower score of 0.1. This indicates the potency of self-presentation that is characteristic of interview data and speeches, thus demeriting the use of content analysis exclusively (Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2001; Millon, 1990; Millon and Davis, 2000, in Strack, 2005; Strack, 2005).
5.5. Trait Discussion – Self-Confidence and Conceptual Complexity

The hypothesised results for self-confidence and conceptual complexity – high-low for both leaders – contrasts with the obtained results, which convey low-high scores for Hussein, and moderate-moderate scores for Milošević. Nevertheless, alignment of secondary personality profile insights with the predicted high-low results indicate that – similarly to the traits examined in Section 5.4. – discrepancies across scores signify the influence of data distortions within the content analysis methodology. Highlighting the grandiose self-conception of dictators by referencing arrogant and didactic mannerisms, secondary profiles buttress the central observation of this thesis that dictators are ‘malignant narcissists’ (Post and Panis, 2005; Weintraub, 2005, in Post, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999). Moreover, illustration of their low conceptual complexity is evident within examples of courtroom conduct during trials (Chapter 2; Post and Panis, 2005). Reference to the Anfal and Srebrenica crises elucidates high-low self-confidence and conceptual complexity scores further, wherein coercion and control are seen to dominate consideration of alternatives, advancing the observations of secondary personality profiles cited (Post and Panis, 2005; Doder and Branson, 1999).

Signposting low ingroup bias, Section 5.4. alludes to intrinsic high levels of self-confidence. This is due to the interrelation of group identity and self-esteem within social identity theory’s self-esteem hypothesis (Rubin and Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel, 2010; Abrams and Hogg, 1990). Citing the inclination of individuals with low self-esteem to join groups, this theory advises that demonstration of low ingroup bias equates to high self-esteem. As illustrated through analysis of independent research and secondary personality profiles, low ingroup bias is evident within both leaders. Whilst this implies high self-confidence, further analysis of secondary profiles bolsters this extrapolation. Specifically, Post and Panis (2005: 827) hypothesise the leaders’ high self-confidence and characteristics of high-low self-
confidence-conceptual complexity scores, centralising Hussein’s grandiosity with trauma as its cause. Noting how “one course” of reaction to the experience of trauma in formative life stages is to “etch a psychological template of compensatory grandiosity”, and asserting that “this was the developmental path Saddam followed”, this personality profile furthers the hypothesis of Hussein’s high self-confidence. Analysis of Milošević’s actions – at the peak of his extremity (Srebrenica) – implies his pursuit of this developmental path, affirming the proposition of mutual high self-confidence (Goldner-Vukov and Moore, 2010).

Due to an internal conviction of grandiosity, the “profound rich arrogance” of Milošević, invoking “no need to flaunt […] authority”, advances the hypothesis of high self-confidence (Doder and Branson, 1999: 3). Moreover, the interlinked assessment of Hussein’s courtroom behaviour – “intent on being honoured with the proper title” during his trial – highlights low levels of conceptual complexity and the hypothesised high-low self-confidence-complexity trait combination (Post and Panis, 2005: 834). Post and Panis’ (2005) analysis of Hussein’s trial behaviour illuminates the traits associated with this high-low combination, namely closedness, inflexibility, and insensitivity to environmental cues. This analytical example informs that Hussein’s grandiose self-conception diminished any adaptiveness, therefore conceptualising the high-low self-confidence-complexity trait combination. Furthermore, with courtroom behaviour equally witnessed within Milošević’s trial, this assessment underscores the hypothesis that both leaders possess analogous trait scores constituting ‘malignant narcissism’ (Post and Panis, 2005). Moreover, insensitivity to environmental cues is further illustrated through both leaders’ “inability to cope with political reality” (Post and Panis, 2005: 834). Whilst this is reflected within both leaders’ courtroom behaviour, the Anfal and Srebrenica cases further demonstrate the deployment of incongruent means to secure dominance when confronted with insubstantial threats. Further, the
enforcement of genocidal solutions conveys significantly weak conceptual complexity, implying a lack of considered viable alternatives. ‘Malignant narcissism’s defective superego is accentuated with the diminished capacity for conceptual complexity, grandiose sense of self-confidence, and deficient reading of the environment. Analysis of secondary research thus reinforces my hypotheses.

However, the LTA results for this section’s traits do not align with hypothesised high-low scores. Instead, Hussein scored as low-high (0.3 for self-confidence; 0.6 for conceptual complexity) and Milošević as moderate-moderate (0.6 for self-confidence; 0.5 for conceptual complexity), thereby demonstrating full misalignment. Regarding self-confidence scores, the overwhelming support for high self-confidence implies that this discrepancy has resulted from data issues. Again, the impact of self-presentation intentions – fuelled by objectives to sustain political survival – provides an explanation for the divergence of predicted and obtained self-confidence scores (Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2001). Despite the grandiosity of both leaders’ self-conceptions (secondary profiles), the impression of low self-esteem denotes the manifestation of an intention to convey humility (Lee, 1995). Nevertheless, these low self-confidence scores are subject to question. Whilst a display of humility garners popularity and thus security, low self-confidence scores additionally reflect a sense of futility and impotence, with such personality features reducing popularity (Lee, 1995). Thus, this analysis spotlights potential inaccuracies stemming from the use of ‘Profiler Plus’, due to the political blunder that a demonstration of low self-esteem would project (Lee, 1995). Regarding conceptual complexity, one explanation for Hussein’s moderate score is the involvement of speech writers. Compared with 10% for Milošević, whose complexity score aligns with hypothesised expectations, 68% of the content analysed for Hussein is speech material. Overall, this contention strengthens the hypotheses of high self-confidence, demonstrating the political
agenda to convey high self-confidence and locating these low/moderate LTA scores within issues of computerised content analysis.

5.6. Trait Discussion – Need for Power

Whilst dictators and ‘malignant narcissists’ are regarded as possessing a high need for power fuelled by its apparent manifestation in the assumption of political leadership, this investigation argues that the grandiosity of high self-confidence denotes otherwise (Hermann, 1999; Kets de Vries and Miller, 1985; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006). This is bolstered by the secondary contributions explored, which highlight both the leaders’ pre-existing sense of power, and the extremity of genocide as protection (Shaw, 2003; Ramet, 2003; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Post, 2005). This perception of pre-existing ‘greatness’ – that such a grandiose self-conception implies – underpins the hypothesis that Hussein and Milošević possess a low need for power (Doder and Branson, 1999; Post and Panis, 2005; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel, 2010; Abrams and Hogg, 1990). Additionally, the obtaining of political leadership constitutes a consequence of the hypothesised trait combination. A sense of entitlement, stemming from high self-confidence, combined with a high distrust of others and low belief in ability to control events, propels the desire to secure an ‘untouchable’ role in society (Avolio and Locke, 2002; Furtner et al., 2011; Valenty and Feldman, 2002). Low conceptual complexity highlights the role of the absolutist political leaders as solely capable of remedying insecurities, whilst diminished ingroup bias – combined with high task focus – facilitates an ascension to leadership (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Pech and Slade, 2007). Therefore, contrary to research that cites ‘malignant narcissist’ leaders as retaining a high need for power due to “egotistical needs for power and admiration”, this thesis advises that ‘malignant narcissism’ reflects this original trait score combination (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006: 618).
Shaw (2003) and Ramet (2003) sustain this theoretical proposal by illustrating grandiosity and insecurity – rooted in high self-confidence and distrust of others – as the propellants of what superficially resembles a need for power. Asserting that Hussein held a “grandiose view of his historic role in Iraqi and regional history”, Shaw (2003: 359) outlines Hussein’s perception of high personal impact on the environment, evincing an intrinsic sense of importance. This self-conception denotes how Hussein’s grandiosity underpinned the role of power that he occupied, whilst this preconception of power obscures any need for it. Correspondingly, Ramet’s (2003: 455) observation that “there is some broad consensus about Milošević […] Milošević’s primary goal was simply to hold onto power” symbolises how a need for power appears minimal; instead, this assertion accentuates the propellant paranoia of high distrust of others and low belief in control over events (Cohen, 2001; LeBor, 2002; Sell, 2002; Snyder, 2000).

Whilst the enforcement of genocide insinuates an underlying desire for power or predominance, the Anfal and Srebrenica cases instead denote the paranoia of seeking to “cling to power” (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011). Underpinned by a diminished belief in control over events, this – in conjunction with the defective superego – exacerbates the perceived challenge to their political survival symbolised by the Kurdish and Bosnian Muslim ethnic groups (Post, 2005). With the rationalisation of genocide propelled by a defective superego and ‘perception-adjustment’, this analysis reasserts the hypothesis of low need for power. Moreover, the correspondence of the need for power LTA results (0.3 for Hussein; 0.3 for Milošević) with their low hypotheses resembles support for this position, simultaneously reflecting the impact of self-presentation on interview and speech content (Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2001). With such content underpinned by a desire to maintain political security, self-presentation objectives would additionally display a low need for power to command the authenticity, legitimacy, and
morale-focused leadership outlined by Hermann (1999) (Shütz, 1993; Sigelman, 2001). Thus, due to the data issues manufacturing the LTA results’ outcome, the value of ‘collateral information’-based secondary profiles is reasserted, strengthening the validity of this investigation’s dualist methodology.

5.7. Trait Discussion – Task Focus

Analysis of the leaders’ fervent need to retain power – a result of their paranoia – warrants discussion of task focus. Whilst Hussein and Milošević were both predicted to display high scores for task focus, the moderate LTA scores for both (0.5 for Hussein; 0.6 for Milošević) assert the impact of data distortion. Arguably, this resulted from tailoring or rehearsal with an imperative of construing balance between investment in duties and investment in the individuals involved (Shütz, 1993; Hermann, 1999). This is emphasised by the fact that high task focus scores promote the relegation of individuals in order to effectuate policy, whilst low scores signify the precedence of morale over effective solutions (Hermann, 1999). Thus, a moderate score resembles the most probable objective when constructing word-selection for interviews and speeches (Shütz, 1993). Supporting my proposition, analysis of secondary personality profiles illustrates both Hussein and Milošević’s actions as reflecting high task focus due to their fundamental objective of consolidating political standing. Particularly, Milošević’s feigning of nationalism and Hussein’s attempts to mirror Milošević’s effective courtroom tactics evidences this (Post and Panis, 2005; Vladisavljevik, 2004). Furthermore, independent analysis of the Anfal and Srebrenica episodes advance this evaluation, highlighting the forfeiting of individuals for the prioritisation of effective solutions.

Asserting that Milošević’s political behaviour was contrived to consistently “achieve and maximise his political standing”, Post and Panis (2005: 825) allude to high levels of task
focus through this description. Relatedly, Alani’s (2000: 42) depiction of Hussein’s “support structure” explaining “Saddam’s survival in […] absolute power” echoes Hussein’s high task force, strengthening this investigation’s proposition of personality parallels. Notably, the assertion that such support was “carefully built up over 35 years through a combination of hard work and ruthlessness” explicates high task focus through the prioritisation of protecting control over the state (Alani, 2000: 42). Descriptions of Milošević as a “champion of Serbian nationalism” who “exploited nationalism to come to power”, however, advance this argument more distinctly (Post and Panis, 2005: 824; Sell, 2003: 170). Stating that in promoting himself, Milošević discovered his “political voice”, Post and Panis (2005: 824) allude to the insincerity of this nationalist display by detailing this “voice” as uniquely “political”. This is supported by Sell’s (2003: 170) declaration that “nationalism for him was just a tool”. Further, this observation strengthens the idea of high task focus by ascertaining the link between such performative behaviour and the securing of political position. Noting that even Milošević’s “wife […] indicated that there was no trace of ideology or nationalism in her husband”, this analysis advances the argument that any nationalism conveyed was ultimately a tool for political expediency (Post and Panis, 2005: 824).

Concurrently, Hussein’s aforementioned attempts to replicate Milošević’s effective courtroom tactics during trial exceeds a diminished conceptual complexity and a grandiose sense of self (Post and Panis, 2005). Rather, such behaviour signalled a relegation of individuals involved or affected, and a focus on seeking effective solutions to the issue at hand (Hermann, 1999). Whilst reiterating the notion of these leaders’ high task focus and representing the prioritisation of securing political positions, this behaviour nonetheless reflects a defective superego and an iterative ‘perception-adjustment’ process. This is clarified by both leaders seeking to subvert the courts’ “legitimacy and impartiality” during their trials,
evincing the “cases” trying “courts” (Scharf, 2003: 915; Post and Panis, 2005; Peterson, 2007; Scharf, 2007: 263). Hussein’s tactics thus express a misinterpretation of the environment and subsequently misjudged behaviour, fortifying the notion of his defective superego and thus a ‘malignant narcissism’ diagnosis overall. This is further elucidated through the cases of Anfal and Srebrenica. Here, the cases reflect Hussein and Milošević’s inclination to pursue pragmatic solutions of genocide, conveying ‘malignant narcissism’s defective superego through the idea of ethical misjudgement and misinterpretation of the environment (Bauer, 2001, in Stone, 2004; Schneiderhan, 2013; Roth, 2001, in Wurmser, 2003; Wurmser, 2003). This epitomises high task focus impairing proper judgement, as the leaders’ perception of pragmatism and effective solutions accentuate their defective superegos. This is spotlighted from the nonrecognition of its extremity and incongruence in comparison with the targeted inconsistencies in their power, represented by the Kurds and Bosnian Muslims.
Chapter 6 – Conclusions

Explored throughout Chapters 1-5, this investigation seeks to remedy the analytical gap in political psychology surrounding dictatorial extremity. Underpinned by the aim to advance theoretical and diagnostic understanding of dictator personalities, this research responded to key research questions (Figure 1.) in order to investigate the academic and political spheres. Through the construction of personality profiles for Hussein and Milošević, identifying their trait scores through LTA and evaluating secondary behavioural assumptions, this research underscores a trait-behaviour nexus within dictator psychology (Hermann, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1987, 1999; Hermann and Milburn, 1977; Hermann and Kogan, 1977; Byman and Pollack, 2001; Druckman, 1968; Byars, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Lefcourt, 1976). In particular, this study’s theoretical construction (exemplified within Figure 4.) – stressing the interrelation of ‘malignant narcissism’ with a theorised set of LTA scores and ‘perception-adjustment’ – illustrates the causal agents determining extreme behaviour within dictator psychology. Bolstering this theoretical proposition with support from investigative findings (Chapter 5.), this dissertation displays significant support for this model (Figure 4.), emphasising the potential for future analytical applicability within political psychology.

Nevertheless, as illuminated in Chapter 5., significant discrepancies were discovered across obtained LTA scores and results from secondary personality profiles. Whereas the latter presented full alignment with investigative hypotheses, the former did not – exhibiting 64.3% non-alignment with both the secondary personality profile results and hypotheses. Such discrepancies query the validity of both result sets, consequently questioning the validity of this study’s theoretical model (Figure 4.).
As a result, this dissertation’s methodology warrants critique (Chapter 3.). Providing a response to two key research questions (Figure 1.: 2.i., 2.ii.), the dualist analytical strategy employed theoretically permits greater validity to this investigation. Further, content analysis ostensibly produces reliable quantitative scores via ‘Profiler Plus’ whilst an interpretivist evaluation of secondary profiles permits existing analyses of ‘collateral information’ to inform critique of the LTA results (Whatmore, 2003; Bryman, 2006). However, Chapter 5. illuminates central issues of data distortion that impede LTA, focalising concerns of contrived word-selection fuelled by self-presentation agendas (Charteris-Black, 2018; Roberts, 1997; Bourdieu, 1991; Gleason, 2018). Although the accuracy of LTA profiling is thus reduced through its use of inevitably contrived data, this investigation contends that issues of bias and intention distort both content analysis and evaluation of secondary literature. This is most acute where evaluation of secondary literature encompasses threefold bias hurdles across the primary data source, primary researcher, and secondary researcher (Robins, 2016; Levine et al., 2009; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983; Mercer et al., 1977; Turnbull et al., 2004). Moreover, the full alignment of secondary research results with the hypotheses solidifies this observation, highlighting the researcher bias of pre-informed hypotheses construction, with predictions subjectively impacted by projected existing knowledge. Further, it is essential to be wary of the inherent researcher bias that permeates interpretivism and evaluation of secondary sources. Consequently, employment of a dualist methodological strategy appears apt, as each approach independently presents drawbacks that require strategic counteraction (Figure 1: 2.i., 2.ii.; Whatmore, 2003).

Notwithstanding LTA’s unavoidable data issues, this investigation nonetheless asserts that its seven-trait framework permits significant insight into leader personality and psychology (2.i., Figure 1.). This is exemplified through the efficient categorisation of ‘collateral
information’-based assumptions into LTA trait themes (Chapter 5.), which illustrates how trait frameworks holistically encompass the core psychological elements of personality (Strack, 2005; Millon, 1990; Millon and Davis, 2000). Thus, aside from issues linked to content analysis, the theoretical contributions LTA offers are supported by the secondary personality profiles examined. Moreover, this thesis’ interweaving of LTA trait scores to ‘malignant narcissism’ seconds this notion by outlining how the ‘malignant narcissist’ condition denotes an illustration of a specified LTA score set. This investigation therefore posits that, despite being constrained by its interrelation with content analysis issues, LTA holds significant theoretical merit (Figure 1.: 2.i.).

Fundamentally, regarding the question of whether this investigation into Hussein and Milošević diagnoses dictators as ‘malignant narcissists’ (1.i., Figure 1.), analysis of investigative results affirms a diagnosis of ‘malignant narcissism’, supplying evidence for this trend across dictator psychology. Notwithstanding researcher bias, the full alignment of results from secondary profile evaluation with this investigation’s hypotheses additionally lends credence to the theoretical model proposed, bolstering the diagnosis of dictators as ‘malignant narcissists’ (1.i, Figure 1.). However, the limited scope of leaders examined, compromised to permit investigative depth, precludes this investigation from asserting that all dictators can be diagnosed as ‘malignant narcissists’. Moreover, the reduced number of leaders examined disables depiction of explicit trends, ultimately preventing the complete fulfilment of this research question. In addition, the methodological issues discussed query the validity of this investigation’s findings, further prohibiting a positive response to this research question (Figure 1.: 1.i.).
With regards to research question 3.i. (Figure 1.), which queries the centrality of ‘perception-adjustment’ to the trait-behaviour nexus, this thesis seeks to illustrate how ‘perception-adjustment’ is central to the process that results in extreme behaviour, illuminating dictator psychology and the ‘malignant narcissist’ condition (Figure 4.). However, despite its reflection across analysis of secondary profiles, the importance of ‘perception-adjustment’ is debatable due to the obscurity surrounding the extent to which traits motivate behaviour. Ultimately, this investigation’s analysis indicates the role of ‘perception-adjustment’ as inscrutable; at present, there are no clear methods identifying where personality no longer influences behaviour, and where ‘perception-adjustment’ must be employed to reduce dissonance. Nevertheless, this study’s evaluation of secondary personality profiles spotlights the central role of ‘perception-adjustment’, particularly within the Anfal and Srebrenica episodes. Despite these observations, it is yet unclear whether ‘perception-adjustment’ is always essential to the autonomous action of dictators, or whether it is employed intermittently. However, the findings of this analysis do clarify that ‘perception-adjustment’ is imperative to extremity involving others. Although this underscores the facilitation of group rather than individual extremity, the extremity of dictatorial behaviour requires the involvement of others to ensure its implementation, illustrating the centrality of ‘perception-adjustment’ to the fundamental operations of the dictator’s rule.

Overall, as illustrated within responses to key research questions, awareness of such methodological shortcomings queries the extent to which research findings can be considered valid. Further, analysis is advised to advance observations surrounding the validity of this theory, as broadening the scope of this research to account for a wider range of individuals would enable greater presentation of trends and “patterns” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 246). Nevertheless, maintaining in-depth analysis across the leaders analysed is recommended to
permit greater accuracy in the results obtained. Ultimately, such development should further insight into the validity of this dissertation’s theoretical model (Figure 4.), advancing diagnoses and understanding across the academic and political spheres into the twenty-first century.


Software

Transcripts

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Milosevic urges Bosnian Serbs to end war. Retrieved from https://infoweb-newsbank-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/iw-search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=R5FE51NMUTU1NTU4MzY0OS40NDg4ODi6MToxMzoxMjUxLjE0LjM1&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-1231BC2985E80A08@2449647-1231BC36AD58F2A0@41-1231BC3701EDA700@Milosevic%20Urges%20Bosnian%20Serbs%20To%20End%20War&p_docnum=306 [Accessed 15 Feb. 2019].
### Appendix A.

**Content Analysis Results: Saddam Hussein (17/07/1979-29/08/1987)**

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Content Analysis Results: Slobodan Milošević (09/05/1989-20/10/1994)

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