The Distinctive Language of Terrorists

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

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Introduction

This study explores the differences in the verbal behavior between terrorists and national leaders. Our goal is to see if remote, or at-a-distance, assessment techniques can identify common characteristics of terrorists' verbal communication that may not be present in the verbal communication of non-terrorist political leaders. We look at the verbal behavior using the tools of leadership assessment. Seven indicators from Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) and two from the Operational Code (OpCode) approach are used to look for a potential set of common verbal behaviors among identified terrorists.

While this study does not attempt to resolve the debate as to whether there is a 'terrorist personality' that may account for an individual predisposition to support or engage in terrorism, it is worthwhile identifying a set of indicators that may distinguish supporters of terrorism. These indicators can serve as useful tools for devising approaches for dealing with terrorism and for conflict resolution.

Methods

Hypothesis

Members and supporters of terrorist groups share verbal characteristics as measured by LTA and OpCode that differ from those of national leaders. Thus, the scores on the nine indicators of terrorists will differ from those of non-terrorists. Moreover, these scores can be used to classify a person into terrorist and non-terrorists categories.

Subjects Used in the Study

For this study we collected speeches, interviews, press conferences, and parts of published books for 23 terrorists, 65 state leaders, 4 former terrorists and 7 leaders from states that sponsor terrorism. Individuals are identified as terrorists based on the United States' Department of State designation of terrorist organizations and their leaders in the 2003 and 2002 editions of *The Patterns of Global Terrorism* (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt). Former terrorists are individuals who have had ties with a terrorist organization, but for whom we have documents after their affiliations with terrorist organizations have ended. Leaders from states that sponsor terrorism are leaders of countries which the United States' Department of State in *Patterns of Global Terrorism* has classified as state sponsors of terrorism. This list includes leaders from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Cuba.

In addition, in order to include individuals from all regions, the FBI was used as a source for classification of U.S. terrorists. Thus, attempts were made to include individuals from various geographic regions in order to reduce any effects that cultural and linguistic patterns may have on an individual's verbal behavior. Our sample of terrorist leaders includes members of terrorist organizations and national leaders from North America, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. Similarly, groups with various ideological backgrounds were included to account for the possible effects that their ideological distinctions may have on their speech patterns. Hence, our sample includes organizations with different missions: religious (for example, Armed Islamic Group, Kach, Branch Davidians), separatist (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeram, Basqe

Fatherland and Liberty, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), radical socialist (Communist Party of the Philippines, or Shining Path), or radical environmental (Earth Liberation Front).

Whenever possible, we collected at least 50 documents for each individual, containing at least 50 codable words. While the documents for most individuals exceed the minimum required, in some cases, 50 documents could not be found for some terrorists leaders. Because of the diversity of document lengths, we used counts of words and punctuation to determine whether an appropriate amount of material is available for a particular individual. A minimum of 10,000[1] words and punctuation was required for an individual to be included in the analysis. In previous leadership assessments utilizing Leadership Trait Analysis it has been recommended that at least 5,000 words be used for adequate analysis (Hermann 2003). Because of the ease, reliability, and speed of coding using an automated system, we doubled the minimum tokens required.

The documents were collected through public sources, mostly from news agencies, governments' web sites, or various regional media outlets.

Appendix A contains the list of individuals, their designation and affiliation.

Variables and Coding:

The documents were coded for evidence of nine indicators from two different approaches to leadership assessment. We used the seven indicators from the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) approach developed by Dr. Margaret Hermann (2003), and two from the Operational Code tradition (Walker et al 1998). Leadership Trait Analysis focuses on measuring the seven traits that have been identified as establishing an individuals' leadership style:

- Conceptual Complexity measures the degree to which individuals are able to see ambiguity in the environment.
- Self-Confidence measures an individual's sense of self-importance or self-worth.
- Control over Events assesses an individual's perception of the degree to which the individual has control over situations, or the degree to which she/he believes that they are able to influence events.
- Need for Power measures an individual's desire to control or influence people or groups.
- In-Group Bias measures the importance that an individual places on his/her group.

[1] The total count of words and punctuation for Arnaldo Otegi is 9,247. We felt compelled to include him in the set for the analysis, first, because this total count is very close to the minimum, and second, because the preliminary investigation showed that he would be misclassified as a national leader.

Of the other collection attempts, the scores for Farooq Kashmiri and Abu Sabaya were not included in the analysis due to the very low counts: 1,802 and 2,562 respectively.

- Distrust of Others measures whether an individual exhibits doubts or wariness of the motives of others, in particular, to outsiders who do not belong to his/her group.
- Finally, Task Orientation assesses whether an individual is motivated by accomplishing goals or maintaining relationships.

The scores on these indicators were generated using our automated text coding software - Profiler Plus (Young, 2001). The Leadership Trait Analysis coding scheme assigns counts for the presence or the absence of evidence for a certain indicator. The coding for Conceptual Complexity, for instance, focuses on words which suggest whether a leader is capable of perceiving multiple dimensions in a situation, or whether the leader tends to classify events or people into dichotomous categories. For example, words that would be coded for presence of conceptual complexity include: "generally", "alternatively" or "ambiguous"; while words that would be coded for the absence of conceptual complexity include: "necessarily", "inevitably", or "obviously". The scores on the indicators are calculated as the percentage of the occurrence of the positive counts (indicating a presence of a trait) of the total positive and negative counts.

The two other indicators: View of the Political Universe and Strategy for Achieving Goals are based on the Operational Code method. Operational Code assesses individuals' belief systems, and in this study we are concerned with whether the political world is seen as threatening or friendly, and whether individuals believe that either conflictual or cooperative strategies will have the most success in achieving their goals. Our Operational Code coding scheme uses a modified "Verbs in Context System" (Walker et al, 1998), which identifies a leader's verb-based attributions. Thus, the score for View of the Political Universe is derived by subtracting the percent of negative attributions made to others from the percent of positive attributions made to others. A score of -1 indicates a highly hostile view of the political universe, while a score of 1 indicates a highly friendly view of the political universe. Similarly, the score for Strategy for Achieving Goals is derived by subtracting the percentage of negative attributions made to self from the percentage of positive attributions made to self. A score of -1 on this indicator suggests than the individual is likely to choose conflictual strategies for achieving goals, while a score of 1 indicates that an individual is likely to choose cooperative strategies for achieving goals.

Analysis

In order to identify whether the scores among the four groups (terrorist, national leader, former terrorist, or leaders of states that sponsor terrorism) differ, we first performed Analysis of Variance tests (all statistical analysis was done in SPSS). Five of the nine indicator scores were found to show statistically significant differences. Scores on Self-Confidence, In-Group Bias, Distrust of Others, View of the Political Universe and Strategy for Achieving Goals showed probabilities of <= 0.05. Because the groups that include former terrorists and leaders from states that sponsor terrorism are small with less than 10 cases, we combined these individuals first with the terrorist group, and then with the group that contains national leaders. Analysis of variance was performed for each of

these different classifications. In both of these cases, the same five indicators showed statistically significant differences, with the addition of Control over Events.

The Analysis of Variance results indicate that a terrorist's world view is different from that of a non-terrorist. In order to see what kind of classification could be made based on the scores on the nine indicators, we performed Discriminant Function Analysis.

In the Discriminant Function Analysis, the dependent variable was the four-group classification, and the independent variables were the nine scores on the LTA and OpCode indicators. Equal prior probabilities were selected in order to compensate for the unequal group sizes. 62 of the 99 cases were used for calculating the discriminant functions, and the rest were used in the validation method of the function. The discriminant function analysis resulted in three functions, although only the first was statistically significant. This function correctly classified 74.2% of the selected original cases and 78% of unselected cases. However, of these, the function had very limited success in classifying the validating cases into groups 3 and 4.

Based on these results, we were interested in seeing what kind of classification would result if we only used the indicators that showed statistically significant differences. This function correctly classified 71% of the selected original cases and 62% of unselected cases.

The small group size for the groups 3 (former terrorists) and 4 (leaders of state sponsors) presented some obvious problems in the analysis. For this reason, we decided to re-group these individuals in either the terrorist or the non-terrorists groups. Because of the diversity of backgrounds of these individuals, a distinct rationale for labeling each of them as either a terrorist or non-terrorist could not be established. Therefore, they were first regrouped with group 1 (terrorists), and then with group 2 (national leaders), and separate discriminant functions analyses were performed. The same prior probabilities and cases for validation were used. When the former terrorists and leaders of states that sponsor terrorism were grouped with the terrorist label, the function correctly classified 95% of the original cases, and 86.5% of the validation cases. When we used only the indicators that resulted in statistically significant differences (View of the Political Universe, Strategy for Achieving Goals, Distrust of Others, Self-Confidence, In-Group Bias and Control over Events), the function correctly classified 92% of the used cases, and 89% of the validation cases.

The discriminant function of groups 3 and 4 with 2 gave similar results: it correctly classified 93% of the original cases and 89% of the validation cases. When we used only the statistically significant indicators, it correctly classified 90% of the selected original cases and 92% of the validation cases.

The following table shows the Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients for each of the two different analyses.

	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients (Groups 3 and 4 regrouped in 1)	Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients (Groups 3 and 4 regrouped in 2)
Self-Confidence	.272	.390
In-Group Bias	.203	.548
Distrust of Other	-.442	-.569
View of the Political Universe	.580	.337
Strategy for Achieving Goals	.066	-.037
Control over Events	.266	.379
Conceptual Complexity	-.017	.081
Need for Power	.323	-.027
Task Orientation	-.224	-.188

The table below shows the Structure Matrix for the two analysis, the indicators are placed in order of the highest absolute correlation between the indicators and the discriminant function.

Structure Matrix Discriminant Function (Groups 3 and 4 regrouped in 1)		**Structure Matrix Discriminant Function (Groups 3 and 4 regrouped in 2)**	
Indicator	Function 1	**Indicator**	Function 1
View of the Political Universe	.794	Distrust of Others	-.759
Distrust of Others	-.755	View of the Political Universe	.712
Strategy for Achieving Goals	.449	Strategy for Achieving Goals	.434
Self-Confidence	.314	Self-Confidence	.368
In-Group Bias	.204	In-Group Bias	.248
Control over Events	.197	Control over Events	.232
Task Orientation	.135	Task Orientation	.125
Need for Power	.082	Need for Power	.037
Conceptual Complexity	-.027	Conceptual Complexity	.009

The Discriminant Function Analysis gave us a useful and highly successful function distinguishing between terrorists and non-terrorists based on their speech pattern. However, the questionable groups consisting of ex-terrorists and leaders of state sponsors of terrorism led us to perform another analysis that would not require prior knowledge of

group membership. For this reason, we performed K-Means Cluster Analysis. Because we had reason to suspect that there would be two 'natural' groups, and because of the small number of cases in groups 3 and 4, we did not expect cluster analysis to succeed in identifying four clusters, so we set the number of clusters to 2 and used only the six indicators that had statistically significant ANOVA results: In-Group Bias, Distrust of Others, View of the Political Universe, Strategy for Achieving Goals, Self Confidence, and Control over Events. The cluster analysis misclassified only 2 terrorists in the non-terrorist cluster, and 8 national leaders in the terrorist cluster.

Of the individuals who originally had no set classification (groups 3 and 4), the cluster analysis placed 4 former terrorists and leaders from state sponsors in the non-terrorist cluster, and 7 individuals from these groups in the terrorist cluster. In general, the Cluster Analysis, was also highly successful in classifying 91% of the terrorists and 88% of the national leaders.

Based on these results, we were interested in finding out how stable the clusters are. For this reason, we selected 62 random individuals to derive new cluster centers. Then, we used these cluster centers to calculate the distance from each of the clusters for the remaining 37 individuals. The resulting classification of this cluster analysis is identical to the classification of the previous cluster analysis, which leads us to conclude that the clusters are relatively stable. As the table below shows, the final cluster centers between cluster 1 and cluster 2 are most distant for Strategy for Achieving Goals and View of the Political Universe in both the first and second cluster analyses.

	Cluster Analysis Final Cluster Centers		**Validating Cluster Analysis Final Cluster Centers**	
Indicator	Cluster 1[2] National Leaders	Cluster 2 Terrorists	Cluster 1 National Leaders	Cluster 2 Terrorists
Control over Events	.35	.34	.35	.34
Self-Confidence	.38	.30	.39	.31
In-Group Bias	.08	.07	.08	.08
Distrust of Others	.11	.20	.11	.21
View of the Political Universe	.36	.05	.37	.06
Strategy for Achieving Goals	.51	.26	.52	.25

The scatter graph below is a plot of the distance for each individual from the two clusters. As shown, the red points (cluster 1) are mostly national leaders, and the green points (cluster 2) are mostly the terrorist leaders.

[2] In the cluster classification results, the first cluster contains the national leaders, while the second cluster contains the terrorist leaders.



Discussion

Overall, our hypothesis that terrorists' linguistic patterns are different from that of non-terrorists is supported. More specifically, the scores on six out of the nine LTA and Operational Code indicators exhibit statistically significant differences across the two groups. In addition, these indicators can be used to generate a model which could correctly categorize an individuals' likelihood to orient themselves towards terrorism in essentially 90% of the cases.

Of the nine indicators the following contribute the most (have the smallest Wilks' Lamba) to the discriminant function: View of the Political Universe, Distrust of Others, Strategy for Achieving Goals, Self-Confidence, In-Group Bias, and Control over Events.

These indicators were very successful in discriminating between the two groups. In fact, if we plot the scores for View of the Political Universe, and Strategy for Achieving Goals, a distinction between the terrorists and non-terrorists can be observed:



When we look at the mean scores on these indicators across the groups, a specific pattern is found. In particular, terrorists tend to score lower on View of the Political Universe, Strategy for Achieving Goals, Self-Confidence, In-Group Bias, and Control over Events, but higher on Distrust of Others.

The table below shows the mean scores on the statistically significant indicators:

Mean scores Groups 3 and 4 combined in Group 1 (Terrorist Leaders)			Mean scores Groups 3 and 4 combined in Group 2 (National Leaders)			Overall Mean Scores	Overall Standard Deviations
Indicator	Terrorist	National Leader	Indicator	Terrorist	National Leader		
View of the Political Universe	0.07	0.34	**View of the Political Universe**	0.03	0.31	0.25	0.18
Strategy for Achieving Goals	0.30	0.48	**Strategy for Achieving Goals**	0.27	0.47	0.42	0.16
Distrust of Others	0.20	0.11	**Distrust of Others**	0.21	0.12	0.14	0.06
In-Group Bias	0.07	0.08	**In-Group Bias**	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.02
Self-Confidence	0.31	0.37	**Self-Confidence**	0.29	0.37	0.35	0.09
Control over Events	0.34	0.35	**Control over Events**	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.04

These results suggest that people in the terrorist group view the political universe as more threatening and hostile, they tend to choose conflictual strategies for achieving their goals, and to have higher distrust of others. Thus, the results of the analysis indicate that terrorists' world views are marked by more negativity towards the political environment. This profile is not surprising given, that by nature, terrorists activities are inherently characterized by violence and conflict.

Similarly, the mean score on Self-Confidence is lower in the terrorist group than in the national leader group. This score suggests that terrorists are likely to have lower perceptions of self-value or self-worth. This negative self image may to some degree account for their choosing violent strategies rather than participating in the legitimate political processes. Moreover, the terrorist leaders' means are lower on Control over Events. Thus, these leaders are likely to believe that there is little to be done to influence what happens.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, the scores on In-Group Bias suggest that the individuals in the terrorist group are more likely to exhibit lower in-group bias than the national leaders. We expected the terrorist group to score higher on this indicator due to the fact that terrorism is seen primarily as a group activity (Crenshaw 2000). Furthermore, Crenshaw argues that "shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are much more important determinants of terrorist behavior than individual characteristics." Due to the strong influence that the group exerts on terrorist behaviors, we suspected that terrorists would be more likely to exhibit stronger group identification, and thus higher score on In-Group Bias.

Both the Discriminant Function Analysis and the K-Means Cluster Analysis gave promising results. In all cases, the vast majority of the individuals were assigned to the correct group. Furthermore, these five indicators can be seen as a measure of an individual's orientation towards the world, and they can be used as assessments of an individual's predisposition to participate or support terrorist activities.

In addition, when we take a closer look at the individuals who were misclassified based on the discriminant functions and the cluster analysis, there is nearly always an explanation as to why those individuals were misclassified. The following table provides a summary of the individuals who were misclassified, and further discussion follows below.

Leader Name	Class	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 1 Selected Indicators[3]	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 1 All Indicators	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 2 Selected Indicators	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 2 All Indicators	K-MEANS
Koresh, David	T	T	T	T	T	NL
Muhmud, al-Zahhar	T	T	T	NL	NL	T
Ocalan, Abdullah	T	T	T	NL	T	T
Otegi, Arnoldo	T	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
Reyes, Raul	T	T	T	NL	NL	T
al-Hakimm Muhammad-Baqr	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	T
al-Hakim, al-Aziz	NL	NL	NL	NL	T	NL
al-Sadr, Muqtada	NL	T	T	T	NL	T
al-Yawr, Ghazi	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	T
Ayad, Alawi	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	T
Jaafari, Ibrahim	NL	T	T	T	T	T
Kerry, John	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL	T
Noriega, Manuel	NL	NL	T	NL	NL	T
Ortega, Daniel	NL	T	NL	NL	NL	T
Iyad, Abu	FT	NL	T	NL	NL	T
Marcos, Subcomandante	FT	T	T	T	T	T
McGuinness, Martin	FT	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
Hun, Sen	FT	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
al-Asad, Bashar	SP	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL

[3] Only indicators that resulted in statistically significant differences in the Analysis of Variance Test were selected for this analysis.

Leader Name	Class	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 1 Selected Indicators[3]	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 1 All Indicators	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 2 Selected Indicators	Discriminant Function Groups 3 and 4 in 2 All Indicators	K-MEANS
Castro, Fidel	SP	T	T	NL	NL	T
Hussein, Saddam	SP	T	T	NL	NL	T
Khamenei, Ali	SP	T	T	T	T	T
Khatami, Mohammad	SP	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL
Qadhafi, Muammar	SP	T	T	T	T	T
Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar	SP	T	T	NL	NL	T

Discriminant Function Analysis 1: Former terrorists and leaders from states that sponsor terrorism regrouped as terrorists

The Discriminant Function analysis, in this case, misclassified Arnaldo Otegi as a national leader. Otegi, however, although he has ties to ETA, has been more recently associated as the spokesperson and leader of the political party Batasuna. It can be argued that his orientation more towards the political process could account for his placement in the national leaders category. The documents in his collection range from 1998 to 2002.

Of the national leaders, Muqtada al-Sadr, Ibrahim Jaafari, Manuel Noriega, and Daniel Ortega were placed in the terrorist group. Of these, al-Sadr can be considered extremely hard-line, especially considering the activities of his militia forces in Iraq during the time of his documents 2003-2004. Indeed, al-Sadr's violent opposition to the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq may be enough evidence for his inclusion in the original terrorist group, however, the actions of his militia men were oriented towards the military and security forces, not civilians, and thus they do not fit the definition of terrorist behavior. Similarly, Ibrahim Jaafari is a current Iraqi leader of the al-Dawa party, but in 1970s has been associated with the Islamic movement specifically to fight against Sadam Hussein. Manuel Noriega was a military commander of the Panama Defense Forces, while Daniel Ortega was a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, both of them are considered hardliners.

Of the more problematic groups of former terrorists and leaders of states that sponsor terrorism, Abu Iyad, Martin McGuiness, Bashar al-Asad, and Mohammad Khatami were placed in the national leader group. Abu Iyad was a member of al-Fatah, in 1970 when the group was engaged in terrorist activities; however, his document collection is more recent (1979-1990). McGuiness, through the IRA, was involved in terrorist activities in the seventies; however, our documents are more recent, from the period of his joining in the political process (1993-2002). The Syrian leader Bashar al-Asad and the Iranian president Mohammad Khatami have been considered moderate forces in their states.

Discriminant Function Analysis 2: Former terrorists and leaders from states that sponsor terrorism regrouped as national leaders

In this case, Muhmud al-Zahhar, Arnaldo Otegi, Raul Reyes, Abu Sabaya, and Abdulah Ocalan (when using only the statistically significant indicators) are terrorists that were placed in the national leaders group.

Of the national leaders, al-Aziz al-Hakim, Muqtada al-Sadr and Ibrahim Jaafari are national leaders who were placed in the terrorist group. As in the discussion above, these leaders can be seen as hardliners. In the more problematic groups, Subcomandante Marcos, Ali Khamenei, and Muammar Qadhafi were misclassified as terrorists. While Marcos has been able to participate in political negotiations, Khamenei, and Qadhafi are hardliners.

K-Means Cluster Analysis

The cluster analysis misplaces David Koresh and Arnaldo Otegi in the national leaders cluster. However, David Koresh is not known to have been involved in terrorist activities other than the events in Waco, Texas. He is included in the analysis as a way to strengthen the sample of North American terrorists. In addition, Arnaldo Otegi has shown indications of movement away from terrorist activates. From the set of national leaders, the cluster analysis misplaced Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, Muqtada al-Sadr, Ghazi al-Yawr, Ayad Alawi, Ibrahim Jaafari, John Kerry, Manuel Noriega, and Daniel Ortega in the terrorist cluster. The first five are current Iraqi leaders, whose statements were mostly delivered during a very conflictual time, and thus, it may not be as surprising that their world view is more negative. Similarly, John Kerry's statements were collected during his campaign for President, as such, his rhetoric is reflective of his view of the political world during this time.

More importantly, though, the cluster analysis placed most of the 'moderate' leaders of the former terrorists or state sponsor groups in the national leader cluster including: Hun Sen (Hun Sen is in the group of former terrorists because of his membership in the Khmer Rouge prior to becoming a Prime Minister), Martin McGuiness, Bashar al-Asad, and Mohammad Khatami. In addition, it assigned Abu Iyad and the more "hardline" leaders (Subcomandante Marcos, Fidel Castro, Sadam Hussein, Ali Khamenei, Muammar Qadhafi, and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani) to the terrorist cluster.

<u>Conclusion</u>

This study shows that terrorists' speech patterns differ from those of non-terrorist, national leaders. Specifically, people who engage and support terrorism score lower on the View of the Political Universe, Strategy for Achieving Goals, Self-Confidence, In-Group Bias and Control over Events, and score higher on Distrust of Others. These scores, when used in Discriminant Function Analysis and Cluster Analysis are successful in differentiating the supporters of terrorism from other national leaders.

Both the Discriminant Function Analysis and the K-Means Cluster Analysis produced similar results. The advantage of the Cluster Analysis in not having to determine a prior

classification for the analysis is compensated by its greater misclassification of national leaders (8 versus 3 in the Discriminant Function Analysis). However, both methods are effective in differentiating between the hardline and the more moderate leaders of states that sponsor terrorism.

Overall, the study suggests that it is possible to assess a person's tendency to support or participate in terrorism or violent behaviors based on their world view and self-confidence. Indeed, the six indicators that are used to assess these traits suggest that terrorists give more negative attributions to others and self, which indicates that they are more likely to view the world as threatening and to engage in conflictual strategies for achieving their goals. In addition, among the rhetoric of terrorists there is greater evidence for distrust of others than among the non-terrorists, but evidence of lower self-confidence.

Appendix A

Group 1 Designated Terrorist Leaders

Individual	Organization	Country	Reason for Designation
al-Zahhar, Mahmud Khalid	HAMAS	Occupied Territories/Israel	State Department
al-Zawahiri, Ayman	Al-Jihad	Egypt	State Department
Balasingham, Anton	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeram (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	State Department
Basayev, Shamil	Riyadus-Salikhin	Chechnya	State Department
Bin Laden, Osama	Al Qaeda	Saudi Arabia	State Department
Castano, Carlos	United Self Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC).	Columbia	State Department
Guzman, Abimael	Shining Path	Peru	State Department
Habash, George	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Occupied Territories/Israel	State Department
Hamza, Sheikh Abu	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Algeria	State Department
Kahane, Meir	Kach	Israel	State Department
Khaled, Mishal	HAMAS	Occupied Territories/Israel	State Department
Koresh, David	Branch Davidians	USA	FBI
Nasrallah, Sayyed Hassan	Hizballah	Lebanon	State Department
Ocalan, Abdullah	PKK	Turkey	State Department
Rajavi, Maryam	Mujahedin e Khalq Organization	Iran	State Department
Rajavi, Massaud	Mujahedin e Khalq Organization	Iran	State Department
Rantisi, Abdel Aziz	Hamas	Occupied Territories/Israel	State Department
Reyes, Raul	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia	Columbia	State Department
Rosebraugh, Graig	Earth Liberation Front	USA	FBI
Shallah, Ramadan	The Palestine Islamic Jihad:	Occupied Territories/Israel	State Department

Individual	Organization	Country	Reason for Designation
Sison, Jose Maria	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army	Philippines	State Department
Otegi, Arnaldo	Basque Fatherland and Liberty -ETA	Spain	State Department
Velazco, Isac	Tupak Amaru	Peru	State Department

Group 2: National Leaders

Leader Name	Leader Country	Leader Name	Leader Country
al-Hakim, al-Aziz	Iraq	Kennedy, John	United States
al-Sadr, Muqtada	Iraq	Kerry, John	United States
al-Yawr, Ghazi	Iraq	King Abdullah	Jordan
al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqr	Iraq	King Hussein	Jordan
Arafat, Yasir	Palestine	Koizumi, Junichiro	Japan
Ayad, Alawi	Iraq	Kostunica, Vojislav	Serbia and Montenegro
Barwari, Nasreen	Iraq	Macapagal, Arroyo Gloria	Philippines
Begin, Menachem	Israel	Milosevic, Slobodan	Serbia and Montenegro
Bush, George HW	United States	Mubarak, Hosni	Egypt
Buzek, Jerzy	Poland	Musharraf, Pervez	Pakistan
Cardoso, Fernando	Brazil	Nazarbayev, Nursultan	Kazakhstan
Carter, Jimmy	United States	Nixon, Richard	United States
Chalabi, Ahmed	Iraq	Noriega, Manuel	Panama
Chavez, Hugo	Venezuela	Orban, Victor	Hungary
Chen, Shui Bien	Taiwan	Ortega, Daniel	Nicaragua
Chinnawat, Thaksin	Thailand	Pachachi, Adnan	Iraq
Clinton, Bill	United States	Pastrana, Andres	Colombia
Crown Prince Abdallah	Saudi Arabia	Peres, Shimon	Israel
Dean, Howard	United States	Putin, Vladimir	Russia
DeLaRua, Fernando	Aregntina	Racan, Ivica	Croatia
Djukanovic, Milo	Serbia and Montenegro	Reagan, Ronald	United States
Edwards, John	United States	Sadat, Anwar	Egypt
Eisenhower, Dwight	United States	Salih, Barham	Iraq
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip	Turkey	Sharon, Ariel	Israel
Ford, Gerald	United States	Shevardnadze, Eduard	Georgia
Fox, Vicente	Mexico	Talabani, Jalal	Iraq
Fujimori, Alberto	Peru	Truman, Harry	United States
Gandhi, Sonia	India	Vajpayee, Atal	India
Georgievski, Ljubco	Macedonia	Yeltsin, Boris	Russia
Jaafari, Ibrahim	Iraq	Zebari, Hoshyar	Iraq

Leader Name	Leader Country	Leader Name	Leader Country
Jiang, Zemin	China	Zedillo, Ernesto	Mexico
Johnson, Lyndon	United States	Zhu, Rongji	China
Karzai, Hamid	Afghanistan		

Group 3: Former Terrorists

Former Terrorists	Organization	State
Iyad, Abu	Al Fatah	Tunisia
Marcos	Zapatistas	Mexico
McGuiness, Martin	IRA	Ireland
Sen, Hun	Khmer Rouge	Cambodia

Group 4: Leaders from States that Sponsor Terrorism

States Sponsor of Terrorism	State
al-Asad, Bashar	Syria
Castro, Fidel	Cuba
Hussein, Saddam	Iraq
Khamenei, Ali	Iran
Khatami, Mohammad	Iran
Qaddafi, Muammar	Libya
Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar	Iran

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